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M. Khaldoun AL AGHA Rapporteur Université Paris-Sud
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Examinada por:
Prof. Otto Carlos Muniz Bandeira Duarte, Dr.Ing.
Prof. Guy Pujolle, Dr.
Prof. Khaldoun AL AGHA, Dr.
Prof. Thi-Mai-Trang NGUYEN, Dr.
Prof. Mauro Sergio Pereira Fonseca, D.Sc.
Prof. Daniel Macêdo Batista, Dr.
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The late detection of security threats causes a significant increase in the risk of
irreparable damages, disabling any defense attempt. As a consequence, fast
real-time threat detection is mandatory for security administration. In addition,
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) provides new opportunities for efficient
and low-cost security solutions. We propose a fast and efficient threat detection
system based on stream processing and machine learning algorithms. The main
contributions of this work are i) a novel monitoring threat detection system based
on streaming processing; ii) two datasets, first a dataset of synthetic security data
containing both legitimate and malicious traffic, and the second, a week of real
traffic of a telecommunications operator in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; iii) a data
pre-processing algorithm, a normalizing algorithm and an algorithm for fast
feature selection based on the correlation between variables; iv) a virtualized
network function in an Open source Platform for providing a real-time threat
detection service; v) near-optimal placement of sensors through a proposed
heuristic for strategically positioning sensors in the network infrastructure, with a
minimum number of sensors; and finally vi) a greedy algorithm that allocates on
demand a sequence of virtual network functions.
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A detecção tardia de ameaças de segurança causa um significante aumento no risco
de danos irreparáveis, impossibilitando qualquer tentativa de defesa. Como
consequência, a detecção rápida de ameaças em tempo real é essencial para a
administração de segurança. Além disso, uma função virtual de rede Network
Function Virtualization (NFV) oferece novas oportunidades para soluções de
segurança eficientes e de baixo custo. Propomos um sistema de detecção de
ameaças rápido e eficiente, baseado em algoritmos de processamento de fluxo e de
aprendizado de máquina. As principais contribuições deste trabalho são: i) um
novo sistema de monitoramento e detecção de ameaças baseado no processamento
de fluxo; ii) dois conjuntos de dados, primeiro um conjunto de dados sintético de
segurança contendo tráfego suspeito e malicioso, e o segundo, uma semana de
tráfego real de um operador de telecomunicações no Rio de Janeiro, Brasil; iii) um
algoritmo de pré-processamento de dados composto por um algoritmo de
normalização e um algoritmo para seleção rápida de caracteŕısticas com base na
correlação entre variáveis; iv) uma função de rede virtualizada em uma plataforma
de código aberto para fornecer um serviço de detecção de ameaças em tempo real;
v) colocação quase perfeita de sensores através de uma heuŕıstica proposta para
posicionamento estratégico de sensores na infraestrutura de rede, com um número
mı́nimo de sensores; e finalmente vi) um algoritmo guloso que aloca sob demanda
uma sequência de funções de rede virtual.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In order to maintain the stability, reliability, and security of computer networks, it
is fundamental to monitor the traffic to understand the type, volume, and intrinsic
features of each flow that compose the whole traffic. Therefore, efficient network
monitoring allows the administrator to achieve a better understanding of the
network [1]. Network monitoring may vary from a simple long-term collection of
link utilization statistics, to a complex upper-layer protocol traffic analysis to
achieve network intrusion detection, network performance tuning, and protocol
debugging. Current network monitoring tools, such as Tcpdump 1, wireshark,
NetFlow, Bro [2], are inadequate for current speed and management needs of large
network domains. In addition, many of these current tools generate a massive
collection of files that needs post-processing by another kind of tools.
In network monitoring data arrives in the form of streams from different sources.
Monitoring data arise from several heterogeneous distributed sources, such as
network packets or multiple kinds of logging systems [3]. These stream
applications are characterized by an unbounded sequence of events, or tuples, that
arrive continuously [4]. One of the main problems of this type of applications is
the big amount of data generated. Even moderate speed networks generate huge
amounts of data. For example, monitoring a single gigabit Ethernet link running
at 50% utilization generates a terabyte of data in a couple of hours. The advent of
the Internet of things (IoT) increases the need of real-time monitoring. The
estimate number of sensors networked by 2025 is around 80 billion [5].
This scenario displays a high monitoring and protection complexity, with several
challenges in security and data privacy. The billions of devices generate a big
amount of data streams, which needs to be managed, processed, transferred, and
stored in a secure real-time way. Besides, the big data characteristics of velocity,
volume, and variety increase the number of vulnerabilities.
1Tcpdump packet analyzer www.tcpdump.org
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Consequently, detection time is essential to maintain security in communication
systems [6]. If detection takes too long, irreparable damages will occur. Denial of
Service (DoS) [7] attacks, for example, need to be mitigated as fast as possible in
order to maintain a proper Quality of Service (QoS). The effective threat detection
demands monitoring, processing, and management of data, in order to extract
useful information from network traffic [1]. Current security systems, such as
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), designed to gather data and
analyze it in a single point, are not effective, since 85% of network intrusions are
detected weeks after they had happened [5]. Moreover, data leaking detection time
is 206 days. Therefore, the long threat detection time makes unfeasible any kind of
defense.
The impact of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks is increasing, reaching
attack rates of the order of 1 Tb/s [8]. The popularization of the attacks is so
popular that it is possible to buy an hour of a DDoS attack for $10 per hour on
the deep web [9]. The attacks were no longer merely motivated by economic ends
and became politically motivated [8]. Currently attacks aim to manipulate election
results, such as the suspicion of Russian manipulation over the United States
elections in 2016 [10].
One way to attain data processing optimization is to employ machine learning
methods. These methods are well suited for big data, since with more samples to
train, methods tend to have higher effectiveness [11]. However, with big data
machine learning methods tend to perform high latency due to computation
consumption. This high latency is a drawback for machine learning methods that
must analyze data as fast as possible in order to have fast responses. Features
Selection is one way to resolve this problem, reducing the number of features to
smaller subset of the original. The main method to analyze big data in a distribute
fashion is the MapReduce [12] technique with Hadoop [13] open-source
implementation. Nevertheless, the platforms based on this technique are
inappropriate to process real-time streaming applications. Applications processed
by Hadoop correspond to queries or transactions performed in a static database
without real-time requirements, data elements are synchronized to obtain an exact
answer. Real-time monitoring applications require distributed stream processing
that substantially differs from current conventional applications processed by
distributed platforms. Network Monitoring normally requires to analysis multiple
external stream sources, generating alerts in abnormal condition. The real-time
feature is intrinsic to stream processing applications and a big number of alerts is
normally expected. The stream data are unbounded and arrive asynchronously.
Besides, the stream analysis requires historical data rather rather than just the
latest arrived data. In cases of high incoming rates is common to filter the most
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important data discarding others and, therefore, approximate solutions are
required, such as sampling methods. Hence, to meet these applications
requirements, distributed processing models have been proposed and received
attention from researchers.
Real time analytic are essential for Future Internet and Smart Cities [14, 15].
Moreover, real-time stream processing enable the immediate analysis of different
kinds of data and, consequently, they empower threat detection. Real-time
distributed stream processing models can benefit traffic monitoring applications for
cyber security threats detection [16]. Sensor monitoring in the Internet of Things
(IoT), network traffic analysis, cloud management [17], smart grids [18] and
security threats detection are applications that generate large amount of data to
be processed in real time. In these critical application data need to be processed in
real time in order to detect security threats.
To meet these needs, Distributed Stream Processing Systems (DSPS) have been
proposed to perform distributed processing with minimal latency. Besides,
open-source general-purpose stream processing platforms are now available,
meeting the need of processing data continuously. These open-source platforms are
able to define custom stream processing applications for specific cases. These
general-purpose platforms offer an Application Programming Interface (API), fault
tolerance, and scalability for stream processing.
Current enterprise networks rely on middleboxes. Middleboxes are intermediary
devices that aims to improve network performance. Example of network
middleboxes are firewalls that establishes a barrier for network attacks;
load-balancers which improve performance distributing workload over network
nodes; or proxies that reduce bandwidth consume [19]. Middleboxes are usually
dedicated hardware nodes, which perform a specific network function. Hence,
middlebox platforms come with high Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) and
Operational Expenditures (OPEX) [20]. In this way, the Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) comes to leverage standard virtualization technology into the
network core, and to consolidate network equipment into commodity server
hardware [21]. In NFV, the network functions are deployed into virtualized
environment and, thus, called Virtual Network Functions (VNF).
We aim to use NFV technology and its cluster infrastructure to combine
virtualization, cloud computing and distributed stream processing to monitor
network traffic. The objective is to provide an accurate, scalable, and real-time
threat detection facility capable to attend usage peeks. The traffic monitoring and
threat detection as a virtualized network function presents two main advantages:
capacity self-adaptation to different traffic network load and high localization
flexibility to place or move network sensors reducing latency.
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Figure 1.1: Example of virtual network functions. Two separated plans of virtual
network functions decoupled from the underlying physical substrate.
When considering the deployment of middleboxes as Virtual Network Functions, a
key challenge is the Service Function Chaining (SFC) [22]. The SFC problem
stands for the requirement of traffic to pass through multiple middleboxes for
packet processing in a previously defined order. It becomes harder when
considering the NFV environment, because allocating virtual network function
over the physical nodes have to consider the packet-processing chaining order
among all VNFs in the traffic path, as shown in Figure 1.1. Therefore, two main
constraints for VNF chaining are to reduce the delay introduced by placing the
VNFs on the network topology, and to allocate VNFs on physical nodes that can
provide enough resources to run the hosted functions.
Chaining virtual network functions is essentially an optimization problem that
recalls the facility location problem [22]. Previous works propose linear
programming models to search for a solution for VNF chaining, considering
resource allocation and the routing between virtual instances [22–24]. Other works
propose to outsource network functions to the cloud [19, 25], but do not specify an
algorithm for placing VNFs on the network. Moreover, there are also works that
place specific-purpose VNFs on the network, such as traffic sensors or network
controllers [26, 27]. Our proposal uses a greedy algorithm to place general-purpose
VNFs over a network topology and compares different heuristics. Our scheme
estimates the resources at each physical node on the network and, then, places the
VNFs according to the available resources of the physical nodes and the requested
resources for the VNF.
4
1.1 Objectives
The goal of this manuscript is to present the research work and the obtained
results achieved so far. The main idea is to show the state of art and the developed
research work. The research topics assessed are Stream Processing, Real-Time
Threat Detection System, Dataset and Future Selection, Virtual Network Function,
and Virtual Network Function Chaining. We briefly describe research topics.
Stream Processing
We analyze and compare two native distributed real time native stream processing
systems, the Apache Storm [28] and the Apache Flink [29], and one micro-batch
system, the Apache Spark Streaming [30]. The architecture of each analyzed
system is discussed in depth and a conceptual comparison is presented showing the
differences between these open-source platforms. Furthermore, we evaluate the
data processing performance and the behavior of systems when a worker node fails.
Real-Time Threat Detection System
We propose and implement an accurate real-time threat detection system, the
CATRACA2 tool [31]. The integrated system allows big data analysis in a stream
processing manner. The proposed system uses machine learning for both attack
classification and threat detection. Moreover, the system has a friendly graphical
interface that provides a real-time visualization of the parameters and the attacks
that occur in the network.
DataSet and Future Selection
We created two datasets, first a synthetic security dataset to perform traffic
classification, second real traffic from a network operator in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Furthermore, we present a fast and unsupervised pre-processing algorithm for
traffic classification. Our algorithm performs feature reduction in an unsupervised
way, without the knowledge of the classes, and normalize stream data. In addition,
the algorithm selects the best features to classify normal traffic from Denial of
Service and Probe threats. We compare our algorithm with conventional features
selection methods such as ReliefF [32], Sequential Feature Selection (SFS) and
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [33], and we show a better fulfillment in
accuracy as well as in performance.
Virtual Network Function
We evaluate our threat detection tool as a Virtual Network Function (VNF).
Consequently, we propose a virtualized network function in the Open Source
Platform for Network Functions Virtualization (OPNFV) that provides an
accurate real-time threat detection service. For the best of our knowledge, this is
the first threat detection function using stream processing implemented in the
2documentation available at http://catraca.gta.ufrj.br/
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OPNFV platform. The provided service is able to scale the number of processing
cores by adding virtual machines to the processing cluster that executes the
detection in a parallel-distributed way, processing up to 15 Million samples per
minute. Besides, the Network Virtualization Platform enables the easy deployment
of traffic capture sensor elements that can be placed and moved to several points
in the network, offering customization and adaptability to network monitoring.
The results show the potential for scalability, as we increase the number of
processing cores in the distributed cluster. Another important feature of our
proposal is the migration of processing machines. The experiments show that our
system can migrate the processing elements without stopping the threat detection.
The live migration enables the organization of the physical machines in processing
cluster, which results in several advantages, such as shutting down machines for
maintenance or for reduction of energy consumption or allocating resources in a
smart way to attend the demand.
Virtual Network Function Chaining
We propose a scheme for placing and chaining Virtual Network Functions over a
network topology according to four different heuristics. The first heuristic places
the VNF nodes into physical nodes that introduce the minimum delay between the
traffic source and destination. The second heuristic searches for the best placement
of VNF nodes considering the nodes that have the biggest amount of available
resources and, thus, places the VNF over the node most available. This approach
increases the number of accepted requests of VNFs in a network. The third
heuristic places the VNF nodes according to the betweenness-centrality of the
topology nodes. In the betweenness-centrality approach, the requests are primarily
responded by allocating the most central nodes on the topology, which reduces the
introduced delay. However, as the resources of the most central nodes are used, the
following requests are allocated into peripheral network nodes, introducing a
greater delay on the VNF chaining. The fourth heuristic weights the available
resources and the introduced delay for each physical node. This approach allocates
the VNFs on the nodes that present the greatest probability of supplying enough
resources and the lower delay. We deploy a greedy algorithm for all three
approaches and we simulate the allocation of VNFs over a real network topology.
We have published as first author
• GTA-17-27 Andreoni Lopez, M., Sanz, I. J., Mattos, D. M. F., Duarte, O. C.
M. B., Pujolle, G. - “CATRACA: uma Ferramenta para Classificação e
Análise Tráfego Escalável Baseada em Processamento por Fluxo”, in XVII
Simpósio Brasileiro de Segurança da Informação e de Sistemas
Computacionais - SBSeg’2017 -Best Tool Award - Braśılia, DF, Brazil,
November 2017.
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http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/ASM17.pdf
• GTA-17-21 Andreoni Lopez, M., Silva Souza, R., Alvarenga, I. D., Rebello,
G. A. F., Sanz, I. J., Lobato, A. P., Mattos, D. M. F., Duarte, O. C. M. B.
and Pujolle, Guy - “Collecting and Characterizing a Real Broadband Access
Network Traffic Dataset”, in 1st Cyber Security in Networking Conference
(CSNet’17) - Best Paper Award - Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, October 2017.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/ASAR17.pdf
• GTA-17-06 Andreoni Lopez, M., Silva, R. S., Alvarenga, I. D., Mattos, D. M.
F., Duarte, O. C. M. B. - “Coleta e Caracterização de um Conjunto de
Dados de Tráfego Real de Redes de Acesso em Banda Larga”, in XXII
Workshop de Gerência e Operação de Redes e Serviços (WGRS’2017) -
SBRC’2017, Belém- Pará, PA, Brazil, May 2017.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/ASA17.pdf
• GTA-17-04 Andreoni Lopez, M., Lobato, A. G. P., Mattos, D. M. F.,
Alvarenga, I. D., Duarte, O. C. M. B., Pujolle, G. - “Um Algoritmo Não
Supervisionado e Rápido para Seleção de Caracteŕısticas em Classificação de
Tráfego”, in XXXV Simpósio Brasileiro de Redes de Computadores e
Sistemas Distribúıdos - SBRC’2017, Belém- Pará, PA, Brazil, May 2017.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/ALM17.pdf
• GTA-16-34 Andreoni Lopez, M., Lobato, A. G. P., Duarte, O. C. M. B., and
Pujolle, G. - “Design and Performance Evaluation of a Virtualized Network
Function for Real-Time Threat Detection using Stream Processing”, Fourth
Conference On Mobile And Secure Services (MobiSecServ), Miami, MI, USA,
February 2018.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/ALDP16.pdf
• GTA-16-31 Andreoni Lopez, M., Mattos, D. M. F., and Duarte, O. C. M. B.
- “Evaluating Allocation Heuristics for an Efficient Virtual Network Function
Chaining”, in 7th International Conference Network of the Future IEEE -
NoF’2016, Búzios-RJ, Brazil, November 2016.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/AMD16b.pdf
• GTA-16-24 Andreoni Lopez, M., Lobato, A. G. P., and Duarte, O. C. M. B. -
“A Performance Comparison of Open-Source Stream Processing Platforms”,
in IEEE Global Communications Conference - GLOBECOM’2016,
Washington, DC USA, December 2016.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/ALD16b.pdf
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• GTA-16-11 Andreoni Lopez, M., Lobato, A. G. P., and Duarte, O. C. M. B. -
“Monitoramento de Tráfego e Detecção de Ameaças por Sistemas
Distribúıdos de Processamento de Fluxos: uma Análise de Desempenho”, in
XXI Workshop de Gerência e Operação de Redes e Serviços (WGRS 2016) -
SBRC’2016, Salvador-Bahia, BA, Brazil, May 2016.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/ALD16b.pdf
• GTA-16-05 Andreoni Lopez, M., Mattos, D. M. F., and Duarte, O. C. M. B.
- “An elastic intrusion detection system for software networks”, in Annals of
Telecommunications, Springer, ISSN 0003-4347, DOI
10.1007/s12243-016-0506-y, 2016.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/AMD16.pdf
We also have published as co-author
• GTA-18-08 Sanz, I. J., Andreoni Lopez, M., Rebello, G. A. F. and Duarte,
O. C. M. B.- “Um Sistema de Detecção de Ameaças Distribúıdos de Rede
baseado em Aprendizagem por Grafo”, in XXXVI Simpósio Brasileiro de
Redes de Computadores e Sistemas Distribúıdos - SBRC’2018. Campos de
Jordão, SP, Brazil, May 2018
• GTA-18-02 Lobato, A. G. P., Andreoni Lopez, M., Sanz, I. J., Cardenas, A.
A., Duarte, O. C. M. B. and Pujolle, Guy- “An Adaptive Real-Time
Architecture for Zero-Day Threat Detection”, to be published in IEEE
International Conference on Communications - ICC 2018, May 2018.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/LASC18.pdf
• GTA-17-22 Sanz, I. J., Andreoni Lopez, M., Mattos, D. M. F., and Duarte,
O. C. M. B. - “A Cooperation-Aware Virtual Network Function for Proactive
Detection of Distributed Port Scanning”, in 1st Cyber Security in
Networking Conference (CSNet’17), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, October 2017.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/SAMD17.pdf
• GTA-17-16 Lobato, A. P., Andreoni Lopez, M. E., Rebello, G. A. F., and
Duarte, O. C. M. B. - “Um Sistema Adaptativo de Detecção e Reação a
Ameaças”, to be published in Anais do XVII Simpósio Brasileiro em
Segurança da Informação e de Sistemas Computacionais - SBSeg’17, Brasilia,
DF, Brazil, November 2017.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/LLD17.pdf
• GTA-17-15 Sanz, I. J., Alvarenga, I. D., Andreoni Lopez, M. E., Mauricio, L.
A. F., Mattos, D. M. F., Rubistein, M. G. and Duarte, O. C. M. B. - “Uma
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Avaliação de Desempenho de Segurança Definida por Software através de
Cadeias de Funções de Rede”, to be published in Anais do XVII Simpósio
Brasileiro em Segurança da Informação e de Sistemas Computacionais -
SBSeg’17, Brasilia, DF, Brazil, November 2017.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/SAA17.pdf
• GTA-16-08 Lobato, A. G. P., Andreoni Lopez, M. and Duarte, O. C. M. B. -
“An Accurate Threat Detection System through Real-Time Stream
Processing”, Technical Report, Electrical Engineering Program,
COPPE/UFRJ, April 2016.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/LAD16.pdf
• GTA-16-10 Lobato, A. G. P., Andreoni Lopez, M. and Duarte, O. C. M. B. -
“Um Sistema Acurado de Detecção de Ameaças em Tempo Real por
Processamento de Fluxos”, in XXXIV Simpósio Brasileiro de Redes de
Computadores e Sistemas Distribúıdos - SBRC’2016, Salvador- Bahia, BA,
Brazil, May 2016.
http://www.gta.ufrj.br/ftp/gta/TechReports/LAD16b.pdf
1.2 Text Organization
The rest of the paper is organized in six chapters. Chapter 3 discuss related work.
Then, we introduce the concept of Stream processing, we compare stream
processing platforms in Chapter 4 and we present the CATRACA tool for network
monitoring and real-time threat detection system. In Chapter 5, we introduce the
security dataset and the network operator dataset, we also discuss the feature
selection methods proposing a new future selection algorithm. In addition, we
propose an algorithm for stream data normalization. Chapter 6 presents the
Virtual Network Function for threat classification and an algorithm for VNF
chaining. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the work and discuss the future work.
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Chapter 2
Conclusion
This work proposed a fast and efficient network monitoring and threat detection
system. We used a combination of machine learning and stream processing for real
time threat detection. A new generation of tool is needed in order to real-time
monitor and secure computer network. We described and compared the
three-major open source distributed stream processing systems: Apache Storm,
Apache Flink, and Apache Spark Streaming. We performed throughput analysis,
allocating more processing cores to achieve higher processing rates, Apache Storm
was able to process up to 15 Million samples per minute. Also, we performed fault
tolerance test to compare these three most popular open-source Distribute Stream
Processors (DSP). In this case, we show that Spark streaming, using micro-batch
processing model, can recover the failure without losing any messages. Spark
Streaming stores the full processing state of the micro-batches and distributes the
interrupted processing homogeneously among other worker nodes.
In order to increase the analysis speed and improve the efficiency of big data
analysis, it is mandatory to implement pre-processing methods. This work
presented and compared different methods for dimensionality reduction and
Feature selection. Furthermore, we proposed a new fast-unsupervised algorithm for
pre-process stream data. The algorithm includes feature selection and data
normalization. Our feature selection algorithm calculates the correlation of the
features in a network traffic data and selects the best features in an unsupervised
way. We selected the features with the higher absolute correlation in comparison
with the others. This procedure tends to gather the features with most of the
information of the dataset in a new set of features. The reduced new set of features
is used, thus, to train the machine learning methods that classify and characterize
the network traffic. Our algorithm was up to 10 times faster than literature
algorithms for feature selection. We evaluated the feature selection algorithm in
two different datasets achieving good performance. Moreover, our pre-processing
algorithm is able to detect concept-drift in streaming data. We showed that our
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normalizer adapts the data to a normal distribution reducing the error of machine
learning classifiers. To evaluate the proposed algorithms, we implement eight
machine learning algorithms, decision tree, neural networks, k-nearest neighbors,
support vector machine with linear and RBF kernel, Gaussian Naive Bayes and
Stochastic Gradient Descendent. We evaluated their performance under six
metrics, accuracy, precision, sensitivity, F-1 score, classification and training time.
We created two datasets publicly available. First a synthetic security dataset
obtaining real network traffic along with network threats composed of 24 features.
The dataset contains more than 16 different types of attacks, as well as normal
network traffic. The second dataset is composed by more than ten days of real
traffic from a real telecommunication operator network (NetOp) located in the city
of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The dataset represents the use of the fixed-line access
service of 373 home users. The analysis of the data allows identifying that the
main services accessed are those of DNS and web services. We use this information
to create more than 5 TB of data combined in 45 flows features.
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is a promising technique that enables to
decouple the network function from its physical realization by virtualizing the
network equipment. Thus, network functions are deployed within virtual
environment and, thus, called Virtual Network Functions (VNF). Therefore, we
deploy our threat detection system as a virtualized network function. The threat
detection function is implemented in the Open-source Platform for Network
Function Virtualization (OPNFV) and shows high performance and live migration
features. The results shown that the implemented function prototype presents a
high throughput and a low latency.
Combining stream processing, machine learning and feature selection we created
the CATRACA tool. The proposed tool is executed in an OPNFV environment
allowing the system to perform migration as closets as possible to the source
attack. Moreover, the tool combines batch and stream processing in a big data
architecture that allows to performs threat analysis on incoming traffic in real time
on a historical database. Our tool displays the knowledge extracted from the
enriched data through a graphical user interface for visualizing different analyzes
and the geographical location of the source and destination of the threats in real
time. CATRACA code is publicly available.
Finally, we proposed a method for the strategic location of traffic capture sensors.
For this, a mathematical modeling was developed, obtaining a heuristic that takes
into account the minimum number of sensors reached the maximum coverage of
the network. The evaluation of the heuristic was analyzed in two different real
topologies. The results show that with a high network coverage the proposed
system has a great gain in relation to random choice. In addition, we model and
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discuss the VNF sensor placement as an NP -hard problem. Our heuristic reduces
the number of sensor and maximizes the network coverage.
We propose a VNF chaining scheme, in which a greedy algorithm places the VNFs
on the network according to four different criteria. Our simulation and results
show that using a heuristic for placing VNFs on nodes with the biggest amount of
available resources increases the acceptation rate of VNF requests. Our simulation
and results show that using a heuristic for placing VNFs on nodes with the biggest
amount of available resources increases the acceptation rate of VNF requests by
53%. Moreover, we also show that using a heuristic for introducing minimum delay
on the path, we are able to reduce the average packet-processing delay by 52%.
2.1 Future Work
New methods of anomaly detection and traffic classification need to be
experimented in CATRACA to avoid the use of the batch layer. Algorithms such
as deep learning or Hoeffding Trees should be implemented in the tool. Due to the
distributed nature of our monitoring and threat detection tool, we need to
implement an algorithm for event correlation. A future work foresees to detect
intrusion symptoms by collecting diverse information at several architectural
levels, from raw packet until system logs, using distributed security probes, as well
as performing complex event analysis based on a complex event processin
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Chapter 3
Related Work
This chapter discusses the state of art and presents the related work of the topics
addressed in this work. We divide this chapter in four main topics. Section 3.1
describes the related work concerning Stream Processing Platforms. Section 3.2
addresses Real-time threat detection. Virtual Network Functions are presented in
Section 3.3 and service chaining is introduced in Section 3.4.
3.1 Stream Processing Platforms Comparison
Distributed real-time stream processing systems is a recent topic that is gaining a
lot of attention from researchers. Hence, performance evaluations and comparisons
between stream processing systems are fairly unexplored in the scientific literature.
Hesse and Lorenz compare the Apache Storm, Flink, Spark Streaming, and Samza
platforms [34]. The comparison is restricted to description of the architecture and
its main elements. Gradvohl et. al analyze and compare Millwheel, S4, Spark
Streaming, and Storm systems, focusing on the fault tolerance aspect in processing
systems [35]. Actually, these two above cited paper are restricted to conceptual
discussions without experimental performance evaluation. Landset et. al perform
a summary of the tools used for process big data [36], which shows the architecture
of the stream processing systems. However, the major focus is in batch processing
tools, which use the techniques of MapReduce. Roberto Colucci et. al show the
practical feasibility and good performance of distributed stream processing systems
for monitoring Signaling System number 7 (SS7) in a Global System for Mobile
communications (GSM) machine-to-machine (M2M) application [37]. They
analyze and compare the performance of two stream processing systems: Storm
and Quasit, a prototype of University of Bologna. The main result is to prove
Storm practicability to process in real time a large amount of data from a mobile
application.
Nabi et. al compare Apache Storm with IBM InfoSphere Streams platform in an
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e-mail message processing application [38]. The results show a better performance
of InfoSphere compared to Apache Storm in relation to throughput and CPU
utilization. However, InfoSphere is an IBM proprietary system and the source code
is unavailable. Lu et. al propose a benchmark [39] creating a first step in the
experimental comparison of stream processing platforms. They measure the
latency and throughput of Apache Spark and Apache Storm. The paper does not
provide results in relation to Apache Flink and the behavior of the systems under
failure.
Dayarathna e Suzumura [40] compare the throughput, CPU and memory
consumption, and network usage for the stream processing systems S, S4, and the
Event Stream Processor Esper. These systems differ in their architecture. The S
system follows the manager/workers model, S4 has a decentralized symmetric
actor model, and finally Esper is software running on the top of Stream Processor.
Although the analysis using benchmarks is interesting, almost all evaluated
systems are already discontinued or not currently have significant popularity.
Unlike the most of above-mentioned papers, we focus on open-source stream
processing systems that are current available such as Apache Storm, Flink, and
Spark Streaming [41, 42]. We aim at describing the architectural differences of
these systems and providing experimental performance results focusing on the
throughput and parallelism in a threat detection application on a dataset created
by the authors.
3.2 Real-Time Threat Detection
Some proposals use Apache Storm stream processing tool to perform real-time
anomaly detection. Du et al. use the Flume and Storm tool for traffic monitoring
to detect anomalies. The proposal is to make the detection through the k-NN
algorithm [43]. The article presents some performance results, but it lacks
evaluation of the accuracy of detection and the tool only receive data from a
centralized node, ignoring data from distributed sources. The work of Zhao et al.
uses the Kafka and Storm, as well as the previous work, for the detection of
network anomalies [44], characterizing flows in the NetFlow format. He et al.
propose a combination of the distributed processing platforms Hadoop and Storm,
in real time, for the detection of anomalies. In this proposal, a variant of the k-NN
algorithm is used as the anomaly detection algorithm [45]. The results show a
good performance in real time, however without using any process of reaction and
prevention of the threats. Mylavarapu et al. propose to use Storm as a stream
processing platform for intrusion detection [46].
Dos Santos et al. uses a combination of Snort IDS and OpenFlow to create
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Of-IDPS. Snort IDS is used as a detection tool, while OpenFlow actions perform
the mitigation or prevention of detected attacks [47]. An evolution of of-IDPS was
proposed to develop an Autonomous Computation (AC) system to automatically
create security rules in Software Defined Network (SDN) switches [6]. Rules are
created applying a machine learning algorithm to Snort IDS alerts and OpenFlow
logs. The machine learning method used in this work is the FP-Growth to find
frequent item sets, also called association rules. Schuartz et al. propose a
distributed system for threat detection in Big Data traffic [48]. Apache Storm and
Weka machine learning tool are used to analyze KDD-99 dataset. The system is
based in lambda big data architecture that combines batch and stream processing.
Stream processing platforms have been used for security initiatives. Apache
Metron1 is a security analysis framework based on big data processing. Metron
architecture consists of acquisition, consumption, distributed processing,
enrichment, storage and visualization of the data layers. The key idea of this
framework is to allow the correlation of security events from different sources. To
this end, the framework employs distributed data sources such as sensors in the
network, action logs of active network security elements and telemetry sources.
The framework also relies on a historical foundation of network threats from Cisco.
Apache Spot2 is a project similar to Apache Metron still in incubation. Apache
Spot uses telemetry and machine learning techniques for packet analysis to detect
threats. The creators say that the big difference with Apache Metron is the ability
to use common open data models for networking. Stream4Flow3 uses Apache
Spark with the ElasticStack stack for network monitoring. The prototype serves as
a visualization of network parameters. Stream4Flow [49], however, has no
intelligence to perform anomaly detection. Hogzilla4 is an intrusion detection
system (IDS) with support for Snort, SFlows, GrayLog, Apache Spark, HBase and
libnDPI, which provides network anomaly detection. Hogzilla also allows to realize
the visualization of the traffic of the network.
The proposed CATRACA tool, like Metron, aims to monitor large volumes of data
using flow processing. The CATRACA tool is implemented as a virtualized
network function (VNF) in the Open Platform for Network Function Virtualization
(OPNFV) environment. CATRACA focuses on real-time packet capture, feature
selection and machine learning. CATRACA can be combined with a mechanism of
action for immediate blocking of malicious flows. Thus, the CATRACA tool acts
as a virtualized network intrusion detection and prevention function that reports
flow summaries and can be linked to other network virtualized functions [50] as
1http://metron.apache.org/ accessed April 2018
2http://spot.incubator.apache.org, accessed April 2018
3https://github.com/CSIRT-MU/Stream4Flow, accessed April 2018
4http://ids-hogzilla.org/ accessed April 2018
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defined in the network function chain patterns (Service Function Chaining - SFC)
and network service headers (Network Service Header - NSH).
3.3 Virtual Network Function
Machine learning is used for attack detection in virtualized environments [51, 52].
Azmandian et al. present an application based on machine learning to
automatically detect malicious attacks on typical server workloads running on
virtual machines. The key idea is to obtain the feature selection by Sequential
Floating Forward Selection (SFFS) algorithm, also known as Floating Forward
Search, and, then, classify the attacks with the K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and
the Local Outlier Factor (LOF) machine learning algorithms. The system runs in
one physical machine under VirtualBox environment. Li et al. present
cloudmon [52], a Network Intrusion Detection System Virtual Appliance
(NIDS-VA), or virtualized NIDS. Cloudmon enables dynamic resource provisioning
and live placement for NIDS-VAs in Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud
environments. The work uses Snort IDS and Xen hypervisor for virtual machine
deployment. Moreover, Cloudmon uses fuzzy model and global resource scheduling
to avoid idle resources in a cloud environment. The proposal employs the
conventional Snort IDS, based on signature method, to detect misuse and focuses
on the resource allocation. BroFlow covers the detection and mitigation of Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks. Sensors run in virtual machine under Xen hypervisor,
and, thus, include a mechanism for optimal sensor distribution in the network [16].
An attack mitigation solution, based on Software Defined Networking,
complements the proposal, focusing on DoS attacks detection based on an anomaly
algorithm implemented in the Bro IDS.
CATRACA is proposed as a virtualized network function on Open Source
Platform for Network Function Virtualization (OPNFV) that provides a threat
detection facility. The function employs open source tools to detect threats in real
time using flow processing and machine learning techniques.
The problem of specific sensor placement is studied by Chen et al.. The authors
propose a technique based on Genetic Algorithms (GA) [53] for sensor placement.
The proposed algorithm has as heuristic the minimization in the sensor number
and the maximization of the detection rate. Bouet et al. also use GA as
optimization technique for the deployment of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) virtual
sensors [54]. Bouet proposal minimize the sensor number and the load analyzed by
each sensor, however, this proposal based on GA requires high processing time to
obtain the results without warranting the solution convergence [55]. We model and
propose an heuristic for optimization in VNF sensor placement, reducing the
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number of sensor and maximizing the network coverage [56, 57].
3.4 Service Chaining
Virtual Network Function chaining is currently a trend topic in research. Several
researches deal with the optimization problem to place a set of VNFs [22–24].
Addis et al. propose a mixed integer linear programming formulation to solve the
VNF placement optimization from the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) point of
view [23]. In a similar way, Bari et. al use a Integer Linear Programming in order
to optimize the cost of deploying a new VNF, the energy cost for running a VNF,
and the cost of forwarding traffic to and from a VNF [22]. A Pareto optimization
is used for placing chained VNFs in an operator’s network with multiple sites,
based on requirements of the tenants and of the operator [24].
Other works propose the optimization placement of specific VNF [16, 27, 58]. A
virtual Deep Packet Inspection (vDPI) placement is proposed by Bouet et. al. to
minimize the cost that the operator faces [58]. In a previous work [16], we
proposed the placement of an Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS)
by a heuristic that maximize the traffic passing thought each node. In another
previous work [27], we proposed a heuristic to optimize the placement of
distributed network controllers in a Software Defined Network environment.
Nevertheless, none of these works considers the trade-off of the costumers’ requests
and infrastructure provider availability.
Estimating resource usage for optimizing allocation has been proposed in many
other contexts. Sandpiper [59] is a resource management tool for datacenters. It
focuses on managing the allocation of virtual machines over a physical
infrastructure. Other proposal that estimates the resource usage for allocating
virtual machines in a datacenter is Voltaic [60]. Voltaic is a management system
focused on cloud computing which aims to ensure compliance with service level
agreements (SLAs) and optimize the use of computing resources.
In Section 6.3, we propose four heuristics in order to minimize the delay between
source and destination nodes for the best costumer Quality of Experience (QoE).
Another heuristic is proposed to minimize the resource usage on the network nodes
to increase Infrastructure Provider (IP) benefits. Finally, a heuristic for using the
most central nodes first to improve costumer QoE and IP benefit. We compare the
four proposed heuristics with a greedy algorithm and we tested over a real Service
Provider topology [61].
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Chapter 4
Threat Detection using Stream
Processing
In this chapter, we present a threat detection prototype using stream processing.
First, we present the main data processing techniques. Then, we introduce the
stream processing paradigm. Next, we describe and compare the main
Open-Source stream processing platforms in order to select the most suitable for
our Network Analytics tool. Finally, we present the CATRACA tool, a network
monitoring and threat detection tool using stream processing and machine learning
techniques.
4.1 Methods of Data Processing
Stream processing makes it possible to extract values on moving, as batch
processing does for static data. The purpose of stream processing is to enable
real-time, or near-real-time, decision making by providing the ability to inspect,
correlate, and analyze stream data as data flows through the processing system.
Examples of scenarios that require stream processing are: traffic monitoring
applications for computer network security; social networking applications such as
Twitter or Facebook; financial analysis applications that monitor stock data flows
reported on stock exchanges; detection of credit card fraud; inventory control;
military applications that monitor sensor readings used by soldiers, such as blood
pressure, heart rate, and position; manufacturing processes; energy management;
among others. Many scenarios require processing capabilities of millions or
hundreds of millions of events per second, making traditional system such as Data
Base Management System (DBMS) inappropriate to analyze stream data [62].
Data Base Management Systems store and index data records before making them
available to the query activity, which makes them unsuitable for real-time
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applications or responses in the sub-second order [63]. Static databases were not
designed for fast and continuous data loading. Therefore, they do not directly
support the continuous processing that is typical of data stream applications.
Also, traditional databases assume that the process is strictly stationary, differing
from almost all real-world applications, in which the output could gradually
change over time. Security Threats in TCP/IP networks are a typical example of
moving data, in which the output changes over time.
Data processing is divided in three main processing approaches: batch,
micro-batch, and stream. The analysis of large sets of static data, which are
collected over previous periods, is done with batch processing. A famous technique
that use batch processing is the MapReduce [12], with the popular open-source
implementation Hadoop [13]. In this scheme, data is collected, stored in files, and,
then, processed, ignoring the timely nature of the data production. However, this
technique presents large latency, with responses greater than 30 seconds, while
several applications require real-time processing, with responses in microsecond
order [64]. Despite, this technique can perform near real-time processing by doing
micro-batch processing. Micro-batch treats the stream as a sequence of smaller
data blocks. For minor intervals, the input is grouped into data blocks and
delivered to the batch system to be processed. On the other hand, the third
approach, stream processing, analyzes massive sequences of unlimited data that
are continuously generated [65].
Stream Processing differ from the conventional batch model in: i) the data
elements in the stream arrive online; ii) the system has no control over the order in
which the data elements arrive to be processed; iii) stream data are potentially
unlimited in size; iv) once an element of a data stream has been processed, it is
discarded or archived and cannot be retrieved easily, unless it is explicitly stored in
memory, which is usually small relative to the size of the data streams. Further,
latency of stream processing is better than micro-batch, since messages are
processed immediately after arrival. Stream processing performs better for real
time; however, fault tolerance is costlier, considering that it must be performed for
each processed message.
Table 4.1 summarizes the main differences between static batch processing and
moving data stream processing.
Both these paradigms, batch and stream processing, are combined in the lambda
architecture to analyze big data in a real-time manner [66]. Lambda architecture
uses a stream fast path for timely approximate results, and a batch offline path for
late accurate results. In the lambda architecture, stream data can be used to
update batch processing parameters of an off-line training for a real-time threat
detection. The lambda architecture combines traditional batch processing over a
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Table 4.1: Feature comparison summary between batch processing and flow pro-
cessing.
Batch Stream
Num. times it can process data Multiple times once
Processing Time Unlimited Restricted
Memory usage Unlimited Restricted
Result type Accurate Approximate
Processing topology
Centralization. /
Distrib.
Distributed
Fault Tolerance High Moderate
historical database with real-time stream processing analysis.
Figure 4.1: The three-layered lambda architecture, which combines stream with
batch processing: stream processing, batch processing, and service layers.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the lambda architecture has three layers: the stream
processing layer, the batch-processing layer, and the service layer. The stream
processing layer deals with the incoming data in real-time. The batch-processing
layer analyzes a huge amount of stored data in a distributed way through
techniques such as map-reduce. Finally, the service layer combines the obtained
information of the two previous layers to provide an output composed by analytic
data to the user. Therefore, the lambda architecture goal is to analyze, accurately
and in real-time, stream data, even with an ever-changing incoming rate to obtain
results in real-time based on historical data.
4.2 The Stream Processing
The data flow processing is modeled through a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG).
The graph is composed by source data node which continuously emit samples, and
interconnected processing nodes. A data stream ψ is an unbounded set of data, ψ
= {Dt|t > 0} where a point Dt is a set of attributes with a time stamp. Formally,
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one data point is Dt = (V, τt), where V is a n-tuple, in which each value
corresponds to an attribute, and τt is the time stamp for the t-th sample. Sources
nodes emit tuples or messages that are received by Processing Elements (PE).
Each PE receives data on its input queues, performs computation using local state
and, finally, produces an output to its output queue. Figure 4.2 shows the
conceptual stream processing system architecture.
Figure 4.2: stream processing architecture. Processors Elements (PE) intercon-
nected creating a directed acyclic graph. The data stream is received by the PE
sources, they are immediately processed by workers and finally are aggregated at
output.
A number of requirements must be met on distributed stream processing
platforms, Stonebraker et al. highlight the most important [4]. The ability to
process data online without the need to store it for operations is critical to
maintaining low latency, since storage operations such as writing and reading on
disk add unacceptable processing delays. In addition, ideally the processing system
be active, depending only in own policies to operate on the data without relying
on external instructions. Due to the large volume, data must be partitioned to
treat them in parallel. High availability and fault recovery are also critical in flow
processing systems. In low latency applications, recovery must be fast and efficient,
providing processing guarantees. Thus, stream processing platforms must provide
resiliency mechanisms against imperfections or failures, such as delays, data loss or
out-of-order samples, which are common in distributed stream processing in
computational clusters. Besides, processing systems must have a highly optimized
execution mechanism to provide real-time response for applications with high data
rates. Therefore, the ability to process millions of messages per second with low
latency, within microseconds, is essential. To achieve this performance, platforms
must minimize the communication overhead between distributed processes.
Active backup, passive backup, and upstream backup algorithms are used by
Distributed Stream Processors (DSP) to provide data processing guarantees upon
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failures. Furthermore, platforms must store data efficiently, access and modify
status information, and combine them with data streams in real time. This
combination allows the adjustment and verification of algorithms for better
performance.
4.3 Stream Processing Platforms
Stream processing platforms have been researched since the 90s, presenting an
evolution in three generations. First-generation platforms were based on database
systems that evaluate rules expressed as condition-action pairs when new events
arrive. These systems were limited in functionality and also were not designed for
large volumes of stream data. Examples of this generation systems include
Starburst [67], Postgres [68] and NiagaraCQ [69]. The company Apama1, founded
in 1999, was the first real-time, event-driven analysis application company focused
on Business. The technology provided by the Apama platform allowed to monitor
events, analyze them and perform actions in milliseconds.
Second-generation systems focus on extending the Structured Query Language
(SQL) to process stream data by exploring the similarities between a stream and
an online query. In May 2003, at Stanford University, the STanford stREam datA
Manager (STREAM) [70] project was created. The STREAM project is considered
to be one of the first general-purpose Data Stream Management Systems (DSMS).
The STREAM project prompted the foundation in 2003 of Coral82. In 2007,
Coral8 launched a commercial platform, based on Microsoft technologies, capable
of processing and analyzing thousands of SQL requests per second. The
Aurora [62] project was launched in 2002 in a collaboration with Brandeis
University, Brown University and MIT. The main drawback of Aurora is that the
project was designed as a single, centralized flow processing mechanism. A new
distributed version was released in 2003, called Aurora*. One last version was
officially released under the name Borealis [63], with some other improvements,
such as fault tolerance. The Medusa [71] project used the Borealis distribution to
create a federated flow processing system. Borealis and Medusa became obsolete in
2008. The Aurora/Borealis projects boosted in 2003 the founding of the company
StreamBase System3, which commercially launched the StreamBase platform for
Complex Event Processing (CEP) for decision-making purposes. The University of
1The first real-time event analysis company, Apama Stream Analyt-
ics, was sold in 2005 to Progress Software Coorporation for $ 25 million.
https://www.softwareag.com/corporate/products/apama webmethods/analytics/default.html
Accessed April 2018.
2Sold to Aleri in 2009.
3Sold to TIBCO Software in 2013.
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Berkeley, in 2003, creates a language for continuously executing SQL queries based
on the Postgres database system called TelegraphCQ [72]. Based on the
TelegraphCQ, the Truviso4 was created in 2009, and in 2012 Truviso was acquired
by Cisco. In 2006, Cornell University created Cayuga [73], a state-of-the-art
publish/subscribe system, which developed a simple query language to perform
processing over data that scales both with arrival rate of events as well as number
of queries. Cayuga was replaced by Cougar5 and is still an active search.
Third-generation systems have emerged to address the need for Internet companies
to process large volumes of data produced at high speed. The main focus of this
generation is the scalable distributed processing of data in computational clusters.
Google revolutionizes distributed processing by proposing the MapReduce [12]
programming model for scalable parallel processing of large volumes of data in
clusters. The key idea to spread-process-combine is used to scalably perform
different tasks in parallel on commodity servers in a cluster. The Hadoop [13]
platform is the Open Source implementation of MapReduce to perform analytics
on big data. However, due to the high latency that MapReduce produces, some
projects have been proposed to perform real-time data stream analysis. The Spark
project replaces Hadoop’s MapReduce to perform memory operations that Hadoop
performs on data retrieved from the disk. The open source platforms Storm and
Flink are proposed for stream processing. The Spark platform proposes an
extension for stream processing in micro-batches, the Spark streaming. Next,
Apache Storm, Apache Flink and Apache Spark streaming are described as
third-generation open source scalable platforms.
4.3.1 Apache Storm
Apache Storm6 [28] is a real-time stream processor, written in Java and Clojure.
Stream data abstraction is called tuples, composed by the data and an identifier.
In Storm, applications consist of topologies forming a directed acyclic graph
composed of inputs nodes, called Spouts, and processing nodes, called Bolts, and
edges represent data stream. Spouts are responsible for abstracting incoming data
into tuples that flow through the graph. Each Bolt execute a user-defined function
considered as atomic. A topology works as a data graph in which nodes process
the data as the data stream advance in the graph. A topology is analog to a
MapReduce Job in Hadoop. Both Bolts and Spouts are parallelizable and can be
4Truviso Analytic http://jtonedm.com/2009/03/03/first-look-truviso/ Accessed April 2018
5Cougar processing http://www.cs.cornell.edu/database/cougar/ Accessed April 2018
6Nathan Marz, PhD from Stanford University, working on BackType, develops Storm in 2011,
a framework for distributed stream processing, to handle in real time the large number of messages
(tweets) received by Twitter company. The BackType company is acquired by Twitter and Storm
becomes open source, migrating to the Apache Foundation in 2013.
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defined with a degree of parallelism that indicates the number of competing tasks
present on each node. An example of a topology with two Spouts and three Bolts
is shown in Figure 4.4. The grouping type used defines the link between two nodes
in the processing graph. The grouping type allow the designer to set how the data
should flow in topology.
Storm has eight data grouping types that represent how data is sent to the next
graph-processing node, and their parallel instances, which perform the same
processing logic. The main grouping types are: shuffle, field, and all grouping. In
shuffle grouping, the stream is randomly sent across the Bolt instances. In field
grouping, each Bolt instance is responsible for all samples with the same key
specified in the tuple. Thus, a Bolt will be responsible for all samples of a certain
type and be able to concentrate the information regarding such group. Finally, in
all grouping, samples are sent to all parallel instances.
Figure 4.3: Storm architecture. Nimbus receives topologies and communicates to
Supervisors that coordinate process in workers. All the coordination between Nim-
bus and Supervisors is made by Zookeeper who store the cluster state.
Figure 4.4: Storm topology with element processors Spouts and Bolts. Spouts are
inputs nodes while Bolts are nodes that produce a processing in the tuples.
Figure 4.3 shows the coordination processes in a Storm cluster. The manager
node, Nimbus, receives a user-defined topology. In addition, Nimbus coordinates
each process considering the topology specification, i.e., coordinates Spouts and
Bolts instantiation and their parallel instances. The Zookeeper is responsible for
managing the worker nodes and for storing state of all elements of the system. At
each worker node, a supervisor monitors the performers, which are processes
responsible for performing one or more tasks. Supervisors report the status and
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availability of the executors through a periodic heartbeat mechanism, allowing
Nimbus to identify system failures. Executors failures are handled by the
supervisors themselves, who restart the corresponding processes on the worker
node. A supervisor failure is handled by the Nimbus, which can relocate all tasks
from the failing supervisor to another worker node. If Nimbus fails, the system is
still capable of running all outstanding topologies, but the user is not able to
submit new topologies. After recovery, the Nimbus and the supervisors can resume
the last state stored in the Zookeeper.
Figure 4.5: At-least-once delivery semantic used in Apache Storm. Every time a
tuple is emitted by a spout, a record is saved in the acknowledge bolt. After the
tuple leaves the topology, the ack bolt acknowledge all operators.
Apache Storm uses storage and acknowledgment (ACK) mechanisms to ensure
tuples are processed even after a failure. For this, all tuples are identified by the
spouts and their identifiers are sent to a special Bolt, which stores the state of each
tuple. An example of topology with Acker Bolt is shown in Figure 4.5. For each
processed tuple, a Bolt should send a positive acknowledgment (ACK) to the
Acker Bolt. If all the tuples receive an ACK for each Bolt, the acknowledgment
Bolt ignores the IDs and informs the Spout that the processing has been
successful. Otherwise, the acknowledgment Bolt asks the Spout to resubmit all
tuples and the system goes back to the point of failure. Non-receipt of an ACK is
recognized by the expiration of a timer timeout defined in the acknowledgment
Bolt. This ensures message delivery semantics “at least once”, where each tuple is
processed one or more times in the case of reprocessing. It is still possible to
disable Acker Bolt for applications that do not require processing guarantees.
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4.3.2 Apache Flink
The Apache Flink7 [74] is a hybrid processing platform that supports stream and
batch processing. The core of Flink is stream processing, making batch processing
a special case. The analytical tasks of Flink are abstracted in Directed Acyclic
Graphs (GAD) formed by four components: sources; operators; exit taps; and
records that run through the graph. The abstraction of the topology is performed
through programming in Java or Scala. As in Storm, the task division is based on
a master-worker model. Figure 4.6 shows the Apache Flink architecture. The
Flink master node is called the job manager and interacts with client applications
with responsibilities similar to the Storm master node (Nimbus). The job manager
receives client applications, organizes the tasks and sends them to the workers
nodes, which are called task manager. In addition, the work manager maintains
the status of all executions and each worker. The states of workers are informed
through a periodic heartbeat signal mechanism. The task manager has a function
similar to the worker node in the Storm. Task managers perform tasks assigned by
the job manager and exchange information with other task managers when needed.
Each task manager provides slots of processing to the computational cluster, which
are used to execute tasks in parallel.
Figure 4.6: Architecture of Flink system. The Job manager receives jobs from
clients, divides the jobs into tasks, and sends the tasks to the workers. Workers
communicate statistics and results.
The abstraction of the data stream in Flink is called DataStream and is defined as
a sequence of partially ordered records. Partly because there is no guarantee of
order if an operator element receives more than one data stream as input.
DataStreams are similar to Storm tuples and receive stream data from external
sources, such as message queues, sockets, and so on. DataStream programming
supports several native functions for operating data streams, such as map, filtering,
reduction, join, which are applied incrementally to each entry, generating a new
7Flink was born in 2010 from a European research project called “Stratosphere: Information
Management in the Cloud” developed in collaboration with the Technical University of Berlin,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and Hasso-Plattner-Institut Potsdam. In 2014, Stratosphere re-
names the project to Flink and opens its code at the Apache Foundation.
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DataStream. Each of these operations can be parallelized by configuring a
parallelism parameter. Thus, parallel instances of the operations are assigned to
the available processing slots of the task managers to simultaneously handle
DataStream partitions. This method allows distributed execution of operations on
data stream.
Figure 4.7 shows the checkpoint recovery method used by Apache Flink. Flink has
a reliable delivery semantics of exactly-once messages. This semantics is based on
the fault tolerance scheme with checkpoints, or checkpoints barriers, so that the
system can return on failure. Barriers work as control registers and are regularly
injected into the data stream by the source elements to flow through the graph
along with the sample records. When a barrier passes through an operator
element, it performs a snapshot of the state of the system. The snapshot consists
of storing the state of the operator, for example the contents of a sliding window
or a custom structure of data, and its position in the data stream. After an
alignment phase between operators to make sure the barrier has crossed all the
operators that handle that stream, operators write the snapshot in a durable file
system, such as HDFS. In case of software, node or network failure, Flink
interrupts the DataStream. The system immediately reset the operators and
restarts from the last successful snapshot capture. As in Storm, Flink fault
tolerance is guaranteed based on the premise that the system is preceded by a
persistent forwarding message system, such as Apache Kafka. In the special case of
batch processing, there is no fault tolerance scheme, and if a fault occurs, the
entire operation must be restarted from scratch.
Figure 4.7: Barriers are injected in source elements and flow through the graph
together with the samples, flow downstream and trigger state snapshots when they
pass through operators. When an operator receives a barrier from every incoming
stream, it checkpoints its state to durable storage.
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4.3.3 Apache Spark Streaming
Spark is a project initiated by UC Berkeley and is a platform for distributed data
processing, written in Java and Scala. Spark has different libraries running on the
top of the Spark Engine, including Spark Streaming [30] for stream processing.
Apache Spark is a parallel engine, which executes the MapReduce technique.
Apache Spark is optimized to execute MapReduce jobs into the main memory,
improving performance while compared with Hadoop [30].
The stream abstraction is called Discrete Stream (D-Stream) defined as a set of
short, stateless, deterministic tasks. In Spark, stream computation is treated as a
series of deterministic batch computations on minor intervals. Similar to
MapReduce, a job in Spark is defined as a parallel computation that consists of
multiple tasks, and a task is a unit of work that is sent to the Task Manager. As
Figure 4.8 shows, when a stream enters Spark, it divides data into micro-batches,
which are the input data of the Distributed Resilient Dataset (RDD), the main
class in Spark Engine, stored in memory. A DStream is a potentially infinite
sequence of Resilient Distributed Dataset (RDD). Then the Spark Engine executes
by generating jobs to process the micro-batches. RDD are the basic elements in
the Spark Engine and are partitioned across all the nodes in the cluster. RDD are
by definition immutable, when an operation, called transformation, such as map(),
join(), filter() is applied it creates a new RDD. When a transformation is applied
to the RDD, Spark does not execute it immediately, instead it creates a lineage
that keeps track of what all transformations has to be applied on that RDD,
including from where it has to read the data. All transformation are computed
when an action such as save()/display() is called in the driver program. Linage
allows Spark to recover the last operation performed in case of failure.
Figure 4.8: Micro-batch processing used in Spark stream. The input streams are
received by receptors and it transforms in micro-batch that are executed in a tradi-
tional Map-Reduce Spark Engine.
Figure 4.9 shows the layout of a Spark cluster. Applications or jobs within the
Spark run as independent processes in the cluster which is coordinated by the
master or Driver Program, responsible for scheduling tasks and creating the Spark
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Figure 4.9: Cluster architecture of Spark stream system. Composed by a driver
program, cluster manager and worker nodes that execute the task.
Context. The Spark Context connects to various types of cluster managers, such
as the Spark StandAlone, Mesos or Hadoop YARN (Yet Another Resource
Negotiator). These cluster managers are responsible for resource allocation
between applications. Once connected, Spark executes task within the task
managers, which perform processing and data storage, equivalent to Storm workers,
and results are then communicated to the Spark Context. The mechanism
described in Storm, in which each worker process runs within a topology, can be
applied to Spark, where applications or jobs are equivalent to topologies. A
disadvantage of this concept in Spark is the messages exchange between different
programs, which is only done indirectly such as writing data to a file, worsen the
latency that could be around seconds in applications of several operations.
Because Spark operates on data stored in volatile memory, there is a need to
provide fault tolerance for data while it is being processed, not just after saving to
disk as done on Hadoop. Spark has “exactly-once” message delivery semantics.
The idea is to process a task on several distinct working nodes and, in the event of
a failure, the processing of the micro-batch can be redistributed and recalculated.
The state of the RDDs is periodically replicated to other working nodes. Tasks are
then discretized into smaller tasks performed on any node, without affecting
execution. Thus, failing tasks can be thrown in parallel, evenly distributing the
task, without affecting performance. This procedure is called parallel recovery.
The semantics of “exactly-once” reduce the overhead compared to upstream
backup, where all tuples must be positively recognized, as in the Storm. However,
micro-batch processing has disadvantages. The configuration and distribution of
each micro-batch may take longer than the arrival rate of the native stream.
Consequently, micro-batches are stored in a processing queue affecting latency.
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Fault Tolerance Schemes on Distributed Processing Platforms
A robust fault tolerance scheme is essential for distributed processing platforms
running on cluster, which are sensitive to node failures in network and software. It
should be noted that a datacenter has a structure in computational clusters, in
which nodes are low-cost commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) servers. In batch
processing systems, latency is acceptable and as a result, the system does not need
to recover quickly from a failure. However, in real-time systems since the data is
not stored, failures can mean data loss. Therefore, fast and efficient recovery is
important to avoid loss of information [75].
The most common form of failure recovery is storage and forwarding, also known
as upstream backup. Considering a processing topology, the algorithm uses the
parent nodes to act as backups, storing and temporarily preserving the tuples in
their output queues until their downstream neighbors process them and send
positive acknowledgment (ACK). Every tuple must be individually positively
recognized with an ACK. If any of these downstream neighbors fails, an ACK will
not be sent, and by timer overflow, the parent node reproduces the tuples on
another node. Another form of positive recognition is by group tuples. Simply
identify a missing tuple that the entire group of tuples is reproduced.
A disadvantage of this approach is the long recovery time since the system must
wait until the protected node takes over. To address this problem, in [65] the
parallel recovery algorithm is proposed. In this algorithm, the system periodically
checks the states replicating asynchronously to other nodes. When a node fails,
the system detects the missing partitions and launches tasks to retrieve them from
the last checkpoint. Many tasks can be launched at the same time to calculate
different partitions on different nodes. Thus, parallel recovery is faster than the
upstream backup.
Another solution is proposed in [29] based on the Asynchronous Barrier Snapshot
(ABS) algorithm. The main idea is to mark the overall state of a distributed
system. In ABS algorithm, a snapshot is the overall state of the rendering
distributed system represented as a graph. A snapshot capture all the information
necessary to restart the calculation of that particular execution state. A barrier
separates the record set in two sides. From one side, records that accompanies the
current snapshot, and from the other side the records that are inserted into the
next snapshot. Barriers do not interrupt data flow. Several different snapshot
barriers may be in the stream at the same time, which means that multiple
snapshots may occur simultaneously. When a source receives a barrier, the source
takes a snapshot from its current state and then transmits the barrier to all
outputs. When a non-source task receives a barrier from one of its inputs, it blocks
30
that input until it receives a barrier of all inputs. When the barriers were received
from all entries, the task takes a snapshot from its current state and transmits the
barrier to its outputs. The task then unlocks its input channels to continue its
computation. Thus, disaster recovery reverts all states of the operator to their
states taken from the last successful snapshot and restarts the inbound streams
from the last barrier for which there is a snapshot.
The delivery assurance semantics that a system offers to process a sample can be
divided into three types: “Exactly once”, “at least once”, and “at most once”. The
simplest semantics is “at most once”, also known as “may be once” where there is
no error recovery, that is, the samples are processed or lost. When a failure occurs,
data can be routed to another processing element without losing information. The
“at most once” semantic should be use in applications where the occasional loss of
a message does not leave a system in an inconsistent state. In the semantics
“exactly once” positive recognitions are individual by tuple. Also, in the “exactly
once”, the system guarantees that a source that crashes will eventually restart.
The system must keeps track of calls on sinks that have crashed, and allows them
to be later adopted by a new sink. In the semantics “at least once”, also known as
“once or more”, the error correction is done together for a group of samples, so if
an error occurs with any of the samples, the entire group is reprocessed and
therefore it is possible that some samples are processed one more time. In “at least
once” semantic, the source continues to send tuples to the sink until it gets an
acknowledgement. If one or more acknowledgements are lost, the server may
execute the call multiple times. The semantics “at least once” is less costly than
“exactly once”, which requires individual confirmation for each processed tuple.
Table 4.2 presents a summary of features underlined in the comparison of the
stream processing systems. The programming model can be classified as
compositional and declarative. The compositional approach provides basic building
blocks, such as Spouts and Bolts on Storm and must be connected together in
order to create a topology. On the other hand, operators in the declarative model
are defined as higher-order functions, that allow writing functional code with
abstract types and the system will automatically create the topology.
4.4 Performance Evaluation of the Platforms
This section evaluates the processing rate and behavior during the node failure of
the three flow processing platforms presented: Apache Storm version 0.9.4, Apache
Flink version 0.10.2 and Apache Spark stream version 1.6.1, with microbatch size
set to 0.5 seconds. The evaluated application is a threat detection system with a
neural network classifier programmed in Java. The experiments were performed in
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Table 4.2: Overview of the comparison between Stream Processing Systems.
Storm Flink
Spark
stream
Stream
Abstraction
Tuple DataStream DStream
Build
Language
Java/Closure Java/Scala Java/Scala
Messages
Semantic
At least once Exactly one Exactly one
Failure-Tolerance
Mechanism
Upstream
Backup
Check-point
Parallel
Recovery
API Compositional Declarative Declarative
Failures
Subsystem
Nimbus,
Zookeeper
No No
an environment with eight virtual machines running on a server with the Intel
Xeon processor E5-2650 at 2.00 GHz and 64 GB of RAM. The experiment
topology configuration is a master and seven working nodes for the three systems
evaluated. The results are presented with a confidence interval of 95%.
Apache Kafka in version 0.8.2.1, which operates as a publish/subscribe service, was
used to enter data at high rates in flow processing systems. In Kafka, the samples,
or events, are called messages, name used from now on. Kafka abstracts the flow of
messages into threads that act as buffers or queues, adjusting different rates of
production and consumption. Therefore, producers record the data in topics and
consumers read the data from those topics. The dataset used is a security dataset
created by the authors [76], which was replicated to obtain enough data to
evaluate the maximum processing the system can operate on.
4.4.1 Experiments Results
The first experiment evaluates the performance of platforms in terms of
processing [77]. The full contain of the dataset is injected into the system and then
it is replicated as many times as necessary to create a large volume of data. The
experiment calculates the rate of consumption and processing of each platform.
Also, the parallelism parameter was varied, which represents the total number of
cores available for the cluster to process samples in parallel. Figure 4.10 shows the
results of the experiment. Apache Storm has the highest throughput. For a single
core, unparalleled, Storm already shows better performance with a flow rate of at
least 50% higher when compared to Flink and Spark streaming. Flink has a linear
growth, but with values always inferior to those of Apache Storm. The processing
rate of Apache Spark streaming, when compared to Storm and Flink, is much
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Figure 4.10: Throughput results of the platforms in terms of number of messages
processed per minute as function of the task parallelism for Security Dataset.
lower and this is due to the use of microbatch. Each microbatch is pooled prior to
processing, generating a delay in processing by samples. Apache Storm behavior is
linear up to four-core parallelism. Then, the processing rate grows until the
parallelism of six, in which the system saturates. This behavior was also observed
in Apache Spark streaming with the same parallelism of six cores.
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Figure 4.11: Throughput results of the platforms in terms of number of messages
processed per minute as function of the task parallelism. Evaluation of the word-
count performance in Twitter Dataset.
All three platforms offer the word-count application as examples of tutorials, so we
show this result for an unbiased comparison that is not affected by code
implementation on each platform. This experiment counts the number of times
each word appears in a text, using a dataset containing more than 5,000,000
tweets [78]. Figure 4.11 shows the performance of the three systems in the
wordcount program. This experiment shows a similar result to that shown
previously. However, in this case Spark streaming outperform Apache Flink.
The second experiment shows the system behavior when a node fails. Messages are
sent at a constant rate to analyze the system behavior during the crash. The node
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Figure 4.12: Storm and Flink behavior during a node failure. A failure is produced
at 50 seconds. a) Storm and b) Flink system behavior after detecting the failure
and consisting of process redistribution and message recovery procedures.
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Figure 4.13: Spark stream behavior during a node failure and message losses com-
parison. a) The Spark system behavior under failure, indicating that it keeps stable
and does not lose messages. b) Percentage of message losses.
failure is simulated by turning off a virtual machine. Figures 4.12, 4.13 show the
behavior of the three systems before and after a worker node failure at 50 seconds.
Apache Storm takes some time in the redistribution processes after the fault was
detected. This time is due to communication with the Zookeeper. Zookeeper has
an overview of the cluster and reports the state for Nimbus in Storm, which
reallocates the processes on other nodes. Soon after this redistribution, the system
retrieves Kafka messages at approximately 75 seconds. Although the system can
quickly recover from node failure, during the process there is a significant message
loss. A similar behavior is observed in Apache Flink. After detecting the failure at
approximately 50 seconds, the system redistributes the processes for active nodes.
Flink does this process internally without the help of any subsystem, unlike
Apache Storm that uses Zookeeper.
Figure 4.12b shows that time period in which Flink redistributes processes is much
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greater than the time spent in Apache Storm. However, message recovery is also
higher, losing some messages during the process redistribution. Figure 4.13a shows
Spark streaming behavior during a failure. When a failure occurs at approximately
50 seconds, the system behavior is basically the same as before. This is due to the
use of tasks with micro-batch that are quickly distributed without affecting
performance. Spark stream shows no message loss during fail. Thus, despite the
low performance of Spark stream, it could be a good choice in applications where
resilience and processing all messages are necessary.
Figure 4.13b shows the comparison of lost messages between Storm, Flink and
Spark. The result shows that Spark had no loss during the fault. The measure
shows the percentage of lost messages by systems, calculated by the difference of
messages sent by Apache Kafka and messages analyzed by the systems. Thus,
Apache Flink has a smaller loss of messages during a fault with about a 12.8%
compared to 22.2% in Storm. We obtain the result with 95% confidence interval.
We can conclude that if we want to prioritize throughput, Apache Storm is the
best choice. On the other hand, if fault tolerance and “exactly once” message
processing is required, Apache Spark must be employed.
4.5 The CATRACA Tool
CATRACA tool uses Network Function Virtualization (NFV) technology and its
infrastructure to combine virtualization, cloud computing, and distributed stream
processing to monitor network traffic and detect threats. The goal is to provide an
accurate, scalable and real-time threat detection tool capable of meeting peaks of
use, providing a high Quality of Service. Traffic monitoring and threat detection as
a virtualized network function have two main advantages: the ability to self-adapt
to different traffic volumes and the flexibility of installation and migration of
sensors in the network to reduce the latency in monitoring [16]. Thus, the tool
analyzes large volumes of data, the Machine Learning techniques classify the traffic
into normal or threat, and, finally, the knowledge extracted from the flows is
presented in a user interface. 8
The prototype is divided in three main modules to perform real-time threat
detection. The Capture Module, the Stream Processing Module and the Alarms
Module compose our system to ensure security in several network components.
Thus, several probes distributed in different network locations compose the
Capture Module and, then, the data are grouped to be processed in a centralized
point.
8The tool, as well as its documentation and complementary information can be accessed at
http://gta.ufrj.br/catraca
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Figure 4.14: Diagram flow of stream processing analysis. Analyzing process com-
posed by three modules. The packets enter to the capture module, where the features
are extracted, then the features are processing in the Stream module and finally and
alerts are send to the alert module.
4.5.1 CATRACA Architecture
The CATRACA architecture is composed of three layers: Visualization Layer,
Processing Layer and Capture Layer, as shown in Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15: The layered architecture of the CATRACA tool: the capture layer, the
processing layer, and the visualization layer.
The first layer, the capture layer, is responsible for capturing the packets. The
packets are captured, through traffic mirroring, by the libpcap library. A python
application based on flowtbag abstracts the packets into flows. A flow is defined as
a sequence of packets with the same quintuple source IP, destination IP, source
port, destination port, and protocol, during a time window. In all, 46 flow features
are extracted and published in a producer/consumer service of Apache Kafka.
This service operates as a low latency queue and data flow manipulation system,
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where queue features are consumed by the processing layer.
The processing layer is instantiated in a dedicated cloud for classification and it
core is the Apache Spark. The Spark framework has been chosen among the
different flow-processing platforms because it presents the best fault tolerance
performance [41], making CATRACA more robust in case of failure. Spark is
implemented in a cluster following the master/slave model, where slaves have the
capacity to expand and reduce resources, making the system scalable. Once the
flow arrives in the processing layer, the feature selection algorithm [76] selects the
most important characteristics for threat classification. In the processing step, the
processed metadata is enriched through different information such as the
geographical location of the analyzed IPs. Finally, the flows are classified as
malicious or benign through machine learning (ML) algorithms based on decision
trees.
Finally, the visualization layer is implemented using the Elastic Stack. The elastic
stack allows custom event viewing in real time. Thus, the output of the processing
layer is sent to the elasticsearch which provides a fast search and store service.
Elasticsearch communicates through queries with the user interface that runs in
the Kibana environment in which represents the results to be viewed by the user.
The proposed Traffic Classification
The classification begins with the pre-processing in selection of the most important
characteristics of the flows [76]. The tool can then operate in either real time or
offline mode. The offline traffic classification consists of processing of the
mini-batches Spark platform. In this mode, large volume datasets are loaded in a
distributed file system, such as the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). The
data set is separated into a set of training and a test set at a ratio of 70 % to
training and 30 % to the test. Thus, Spark performs processing by the technique
map-reduce. A machine learning algorithm is trained to obtain the classification
model.
The decision tree classification algorithm is implemented in the tool, due to its
training speed allied to its high accuracy and precision [79]. The decision tree is a
greedy algorithm that performs a recursive binary partitioning of the resource
space. Each sheet is chosen by selecting the best separation from a set of possible
divisions, to maximize the gain of information in a tree node. The division into
each node of the tree is chosen from the argmaxdGI(CD, d), where GI(CD, d) is
the information gain when a division d is applied to a set of CD data. The gain of
information GI of the tool CATRACA is the impurity of Gini,
∑C
i=1 fi(1− fi),
which indicates how separated the classes are, where fi is the frequency of class i
in a node and C is the number of classes. Once it is obtained, the template is
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stored in the file system and loaded into be used in real-time traffic classification
mode online. Thus, it is also possible to validate the model with the 30% training
set obtained earlier.
The Table 4.3 shows the confusion matrix of the security dataset evaluation [79].
The confusion matrix clearly specifies the rate of false positives and other metrics
of each class in the test data set. The rows represent the elements that actually
belong to the real class and the columns the elements that were classified as
belonging to the class. Therefore, the prominent diagonal elements of this array
represent the number of elements that are correctly sorted. In addition, Table 4.3
shows metrics complementary to the confusion matrix. By observing the values of
Accuracy and Precision it is possible to see the good performance of the decision
tree algorithm in off-line classification. The table verified that the algorithm
presented a high accuracy in almost all classes, with a low false positive rate.
Another way to see the false positive rate is to observe the values that are outside
the main diagonal.
Table 4.3: Confusion Matrix and Evaluation Metrics of Decision Tree for
GTA/UFRJ Dataset.
Normal DoS PortScan Precision Overall Accuracy
Normal 29126 1 0 99.97%
95.99%
DoS 60 5845 0 98.94%
PortScan 8 1782 9434 84.05%
Recall 99.76% 76.62% 100%
Table 4.4: Confusion Matrix and Evaluation Metrics of Decision Tree for NetOp
Dataset.
Normal Threat Precision Overall Accuracy
Normal 3713600 30140 99.19%
98.74%Threat 22350 416100 94.90%
Recall 99.40% 93.24%
After obtaining the classification model from the historical base, one can evaluate
the accuracy of the tool with data arriving in real time. The operation of the
CATRACA tool in real time uses the stream module of the Spark platform. Thus,
abstracted packets in streams, captured on different virtual machines in the cloud,
are processed as they reach the Spark platform. When a stream arrives at the
detection tool, it is summarized in characteristics using the selection
algorithm [76], in order to reduce processing time. Thus, the vector of selected
characteristics is evaluated in the model obtained in the off-line processing. After
extracting the analytical data from the flows, the results are stored in a database
for further analysis. The stored data has the information collected during the
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detection of threats and can be reprocessed offline to calculate the parameters to
be used in the real-time model. To make the system more accurate, there is a
feedback, since the calculated offline parameters with historical data set the
processing model for real-time threat detection.
Real-Time Visualization of Enriched Data
The visualization of the enriched data occurs through a simple and friendly web
interface to allow the user to monitor the different parameters of the network in
real time. The open source viewer Kibana, a component of the Elastic stack, was
used for the development of the web interface, as it allows the visualization of the
data in a simple and fast way allied to the performance of processing of queries
with large volumes of data with low latency.
Figure 4.16: Dashboard panel view of CATRACA.
Figure 4.16 shows some of the different scenarios that can be viewed in the control
panel, such as the most accessed destination/source ports, the most commonly
used destination IP addresses, the average size of the flows in the round-trip
directions, the number of analyzed flows, among others. It is worth emphasizing
the visualization of the attacks in progress through a map that portrays the origin,
the destination and the number of occurrences. This is possible due to the
enrichment of the data through the correlation with geolocation metadata in the
processing module. Thus, both data and threats are viewed in real time. In
addition, all data is stored in time stamp, allowing the processing of the data
through time series.
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Chapter 5
Dataset and Feature Selection
This chapter presents and analyzes two datasets. First a security dataset that we
have created in the laboratory GTA/UFRJ. Second more than ten days, in two
different periods of real traffic for a network operator in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Then, we introduce the concepts of Feature Selection and Dimensionality
Reduction, and, finally, we propose a new algorithm for feature selection.
5.1 Security Dataset Creation
In order to evaluate the defense mechanisms against network attacks, the first
challenge is to obtain a suitable dataset for the evaluations. The availability of
datasets in the literature is limited as there is concern about privacy and the fear
of leakage of sensitive information contained in packet payload [80]. One of the
main datasets available is the DARPA [81], consisting of raw TCP/IP traffic and
UNIX operating system data of a simulated network obtained over seven weeks of
collection totaling 9.87 GB of data. Because DARPA 98 consists of raw files, it is
necessary to extract the features of these files to use them in machine learning
algorithms. A greater amount of background traffic and different types of attacks
were added to build the DARPA 99. The first two weeks were attack free, so it is
suitable for training anomaly detection algorithms. In the next five weeks several
simulated attacks were used against the base. New attacks were introduced in
DARPA 99 [82], mainly attacks on different operating systems like SunOS, Solaris,
Linux, and Windows NT.
Most research uses a mixture of the two datasets referring to the DARPA dataset.
The KDD99 dataset, in turn, was created from the files of the DARPA 98 set for
an intrusion detection competition in the year 1999 [83] and consists of samples
defined by 41 features and an output class. The dataset is composed of two weeks
of attacks. The classes are divided into five categories that contain 24 types of
training attacks and 14 types of attacks in the training set, totaling 38 attacks.
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The training set consists of 494,021 flows and the test set 311,029 flows. Classes
include Denial of Service (DoS), Probe, Root2Local (R2L), User2Root (U2R), and
Normal Traffic. One of the problems of KDD99 is imbalance. Approximately 80%
of the samples are considered attacks, which differs widely from reality. The
dataset contains few types of U2R and R2L attacks and many of these attacks are
duplicates. By duplicating samples, classifiers become biased to denial of service
(DoS) attacks and to normal traffic, which are the most abundant in KDD99.
The NSL-KDD is a modification of the original KDD-99 set and has the same 41
features and the same five categories as the KDD 99. The improvements of the
NSL-KDD over KDD 99 are the elimination of redundant and duplicate samples to
avoid a biased classification and overfitting, and a better cross-class balancing to
avoid random selection. Despite the reduction in size, the NSL-KDD maintains the
proportions between classes as in KDD 99, with 125,973 training samples and
22,544 test samples. However, DARPA, KDD, as well as NLS-KDD are criticized
because their traffics are synthetic and therefore do not faithfully represent real
computer network scenarios [84]. These datasets contain redundant data, which
affect the performance of classification algorithms. Another important critic is
datasets outdated, since they have been simulated for over 15 years [85] and many
applications, as well as attacks, have since appeared.
Since the creation of KDD99, other datasets have been published and made
available introducing advantages and disadvantages. In this way, there is no
dataset that suits all cases and the choice of which one to use depends on the
scenario and the application. Some examples of dataset often found in the
literature are a simulation traffic of a real scenario, the UNB ISCX IDS
2012 [86] dataset, a simulated botnet traffic from CTU-13 [87] dataset, traffic of
a real DDoS attack in CAIDA DDoS1 dataset, real traffic of a backbone between
US and Japan in MAWI [88], real honeypots traffic in Kyoto [89], and current
traffic from LBNL2 edge routers.
A contribution of this work is the creation of two dataset with synthetic and real
network traffic to evaluate network security tools. Firstly, we elaborate a dataset
through the packet capture in computers from our lab, GTA at Federal University
of Rio de Janeiro. Then we analyze real network traffic captured for more than ten
days of a real network operator in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
1The Cooperative Analysis for Internet Data Analysis, http://www.caida.org accessed April
2018
2Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory - LBNL/ICSI Enterprise Tracing Project,
http://www.icir.org/enterprise-tracing/download.html accessed April 2018
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GTA/UFRJ dataset
The traffic contains both normal traffic and real network threats. After the packets
are capture, data is gathered from packet header and grouped in a time window,
generating flow data. We define a flow as a sequence of packets from the same IP
source to the same IP destination.
Each flow has 24 features, generated by TCP/IP header data such as TCP, UDP
and ICMP packet rate, number of source and destination ports, number of each
TCP flag, among others. Table 5.1 shows the full list of features. The analysis of
packet header information detects two threat classes: Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks and Probe. Therefore, we elaborate the dataset with several attacks from
both these classes. Altogether, the dataset contains seven types of DoS and nine
types of Probe. The DoS attacks are ICMP flood, land, nestea, smurf, SYN flood,
teardrop, and UDP flood. The different types of probe in the dataset are TCP SYN
scan, TCP connect scan, SCTP INIT scan, Null scan, FIN scan, Xmas scan, TCP
ACK scan, TCP Window scan, and TCP Maimon scan. We perform the threats
using tools from the Kali Linux distribution, which aims to test computer system
security. These attacks were labeled in the dataset by origin and destination IP
filters, separating the traffic belonging the attack machines from the rest.
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Figure 5.1: Correlation matrix of the 24 features available in the dataset. The
dark red points indicate the maximum correlation and the blue points indicate the
minimal correlation.
In Figure 5.1, we plot the correlation between the 24 features in our created
dataset. This matrix calculates the Pearson correlation, also known as Pearson
product-moment correlation coefficient (PPMCC). Pearson correlation is a
measure of the linear dependence between two variables X and Y. Values in
PPMCC vary from +1 to -1, where one is total positive linear correlation, zero is
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Table 5.1: The 24 features obtained for each flow from TCP/IP headers.
Number Abbreviation Feature
1 qtd pkt tcp Amount of TCP Packets
2 qtd src port Amount of Source Ports
3 qtd dst port Amount of Destination Ports
4 qtd fin flag Amount of FIN Flags
5 qtd syn flag Amount of SYN Flags
6 qtd psh flag Amount of PSH Flags
7 qtd ack flag Amount of ACK Flags
8 qtd urg flag Amount of URG Flags
9 qtd pkt udp Amount of UDP Packets
10 qtd pkt icmp Amount of ICMP Packets
11 qtd pkt ip Amount of IP Packets
12 qtd tos Amount of IP Service Type
13 ttl m Average TTL
14 header len m Average Header Size
15 packet len m Average Packet Size
16 qtd do not frag Amount of “Do Not Frag” Flags
17 qtd more frag Amount of “More Frag” Flags
18 fragment offset m Average Fragment Offset
19 qtd rst flag Amount of RST Flags
20 qtd ece flag Amount of ECE Flags
21 qtd cwr flag Amount of CWR Flags
22 offset m Average Offset
23 qtd t icmp Amount of ICMP Types
24 qtd cdg icmp Amount of ICMP Codes
no linear correlation. In the figure, total correlation is represented by the dark red
color and the no linear correlation is represented by dark blue color. Features 21
and 22 indicate the “Amount of ECE Flags” and the “Amount of CWR Flags,”
respectively. The Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) Echo (ECE) and the
Congestion Window Reduced (CWR) flags are used to warn senders of congestion
in the network thereby avoiding packet drops and retransmissions. In the
correlation matrix, these two features are represented in a dark blue color,
indicating the lowest possible correlation. In the case of our dataset, these two
variables are empty. This is due to the fact that we create our dataset in a simple
network that is free of congestion. On the other hand, features 23, “Amount of
ICMP Types” and 24 “Amount of ICMP Codes”, are represented with a dark red.
This mean, that the two features are highly correlated, as a consequence, only one
feature is sufficient to describe the data. In the case of this dataset, the ICMP
type always coincides with the ICMP codes.
Altogether, around 95 GB of packet capture data were collected, resulting in
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214,200 flows composing normal and malicious traffic3. To evaluate the machine
learning algorithms, we perform holdout validation. In Holdout validation, the
data is split into two different datasets labeled as a training and a testing dataset.
Holdout validation is the simplest method and show good performance [90]. This
method results in statistics that are determined with new data, not analyzed in
the training phase, as usually employed in scientific works of the area. For the
anomaly detection, the training is performed with 70% of legitimate flow data to
determine normal behavior. The other 30% are used to determine false-positive
rate and the attack data are used to calculate the attack-detection rate. Figure 5.2
show the relation of classes used in the dataset. The Normal class is around 70%
of the dataset with 106955 samples. The Denial of Service (DoS) class is 10% of
the total dataset with 16741 samples, and, finally, Probe class represents almost
the 20% of the dataset with 30491 samples.
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Figure 5.2: Classes Distribution in the Dataset. The main class is the Normal with
almost 70% of the dataset, DoS is around 10% and Probe correspond to 20% of the
Dataset.
Network Operator Dataset
We collected real and anonymized data from a major telecommunications
operator4. The dataset is created by capturing 9 TB of access data of 373
residential broadband users in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Capture is
performed from 16th of February until 3rd of March of 2017. The dataset contains
legitimate traffic, attacks and other security threats. An Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) inspects the traffic and then summarizes a set of flow features
associated with either an IDS alert or a legitimate traffic class.
3Data can be consulted through email contact with authors.
4Anonymized data can be consulted through email contact with authors.
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Figure 5.3: Typical topology of broadband access network. The connection between
the Home Gateway and the Internet is authenticated and registered by the Radius
server. The traffic is encapsulated in Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE)
sessions between the user’s home and the Broadband Remote Access Server (BRAS).
Traffic inspection and collection occurs after BRAS.
Figure 5.3 shows a typical access topology for the broadband service composed of a
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) connected to a Digital Subscriber Line
Asymmetric Multiplexer (DSLAM), a transport network, such as Multiprotocol
Label Switching (MPLS) network, and a section aggregator Broadband Remote
Access Server (BRAS) that authenticates the session of the users through a
RADIUS server, also responsible for auditing the network usage. Thus, in an
access network for fixed broadband users, the inspection is performed only after
the aggregation of the traffic, since there are no nodes that allow the inspection of
the data in the users’ premises or in the perimeter closest to the users.
The analyzed traffic is composed of the aggregated traffic coming from the high
capillarity, last mile, of different users with a wide variety of service profiles
accessed by each user and generating a large data volume.
The analyzed dataset was created from the capture of raw packets containing real
Internet Protocol (IP) traffic information of the residential users. Traffic was
collected and recorded uninterruptedly for one week in through the tcpdump5
software. The processes of collecting and writing file were packet unfiltered,
therefore, all packets on the network were raw and recorded directly in the dataset.
The physical collection structure has been configured by mirroring the aggregate
traffic of one DSLAM to another port of the transport network metro Ethernet
switch. The mirroring of the DSLAM port on the switch allows all traffic
originated or destined to the DSLAM to be cloned to a computer running an
Ubuntu Linux operating system.
To ensure high-speed storage and to allow easy data transport, the dataset was
written to an external hard drive with a USB 3.0 interface. Figure 5.4 shows the
5Available at http://www.tcpdump.org.
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basic topology and the assembled structure for data collection. It is worth to
mention that analyzing all traffic from operator is out of scope, thus data
consumption samples satisfy the needs for the proposed characterization.
Figure 5.4: Topology of the data collection structure of the main DSLAM port with
373 broadband clients.
The data capture procedure ensures no loss in port mirroring at 1 Gb/s. Thus,
100% of the traffic generated by the 373 customers was collected and recorded in
the dataset, totaling 5 TB of information. Although the average available speed at
each port of the DSLAM is approximately 12 Mb/s, generating a hypothetical
aggregate traffic of more than 4 Gb/s, it was verified that during the entire
capture process, aggregate real traffic did not exceed 800 Mb/s. Aggregate traffic
is composed by round-trip, uplink and downlink traffic. It is worth noting that all
the captured traffic comes from fixed broadband sessions.
The Data Analysis
The analysis of captured data from the telecommunications operator’s network was
divided into three stages. The first stage handles the raw data capture files
through a network intrusion detection system (IDS) and then generates a summary
of the data in the form of flows. We use the flow definition based on RFC 7011 [91].
A flow is defined as the set of packets collect during a window time in a monitoring
point sharing common features. These features include information of the packets
header and statistics employed in the packet, We abstract the flow in 43 features.
The first stage is shown in Figure 5.5. Data analysis was based on the features
extraction of flows represented by the captured packets, as well as the verification
of possible alerts through an IDS. Since the packets comes from residential clients
with Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) access, the captured traffic is
encapsulated in Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE) sessions which
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make the analysis of packets harder for some IDS that do not perform the
inspection of this type of protocol, such as Snort [92]. Therefore, to perform traffic
classification on different types of alerts, the Suricata IDS6, Version 3.2, was used
with its most recent signature database.
The classification between normal traffic and alert was performed based on
Suricata signatures since there was no previous knowledge about threat
information. Because the data is real and hence untagged, it is impossible to
ensure that all flows are legitimate or, even after IDS classification, that all alert
flows are indeed malicious.
Parallel to packets classification by the IDS, the captured packets were
decapsulated from the PPPoE session using the tool stripe7 and were summarized
in flows through the flowtbag8 tool. In addition, a Python application was
developed to process the output of the Suricata IDS, and the summarized flow
features in order to correlate which flow was reported as an alert by the IDS.
Thus, it was possible to obtain a flow dataset with the respective class labels. As
we remove source and destination IP addresses features from the dataset to ensure
the data anonymization, the dataset presents 43 features of each flow plus the class
to which each flow belongs. The output class, feature 44, is given by the type of
alert generated by the IDS or 0 in the case of a normal flow.
Figure 5.5: NetOp dataset processing steps. Packets are first anonymizated, then
PPPoE encapsulation is removed. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is used to
classify alerts, in parallel, packets are abstracted in 43 flow features. Finally, an
application is used to match traffic flows with IDS alerts, generating a flow with 44
features corresponding to 1 if alert and 0 to normal traffic.
Figure 5.6 shows the number of threats and normal flow in each day of the dataset
in 2017. We can see that almost all days contains around 30% of alerts. Only day
17/2 contains less number of alerts. The maximum alerts number was during the
Saturday 25/2 with 1.8 Million alerts.
Figure 5.7 shows the source and destination ports of the flows. The figure focuses
on the 1024 first ports (from 0 to 1023), as they are the operating-system restricted
ports. Usually, these ports are used by daemons that execute services with system
6Available at https://suricata-ids.org.
7Available at https://github.com/theclam/stripe.
8Available at https://github.com/DanielArndt/flowtbag.
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Figure 5.6: Number of Alerts and Normal Traffic flows in Network Operator dataset.
(a) Source Ports Distribution. (b) Destination Ports Distribution.
Figure 5.7: Ports used in flows. Comparison of the use of the lowest 1024 ports
(restricted ports) in the evaluated flows. Because they are home users, the largest
number of flows originating from these ports are flows that generate alerts.
administrator privileges. Our flow definition assumes that the source port initiates
the TCP connection. Because the dataset portrays home users, it is expected that
most connections will be destined to restricted and dynamics ports. Thus, it is
remarked that the number of alerts coming from connections that the destination
port is in the range of restricted ports is relatively low to the total number of
connections on these ports, Figure 5.7b. When considering the flows, in which the
source port is in the range of restricted ports, almost all flows are labeled as alert
by the IDS, shown in Figure 5.7a. Another important fact is that most of the
analyzed flows reflect the use of the DNS service (UDP 53) and HTTPS and HTTP
services (TCP 443 and 80). The prevalence of HTTPS services over HTTP reflects
the shift that major Internet content providers, such as Google and Facebook, have
done to use encrypted service by default to ensure users’ privacy and security.
The relation between the most accessed services and flow duration is shown in
Figures 5.8a and 5.8b. The duration of analyzed flows is mostly less than 40 ms,
characterizing the use of DNS, HTTP and HTTPS services. Regarding the
protocols used, the prevalence of UDP flows is evident and refers to DNS queries.
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It is worth mentioning that the number of alerts generated by UDP flows is more
than 10 times greater than the number of alerts generated by TCP flows. Another
important point is that the number of flows that generate alerts is approximately
26% of total flows.
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Figure 5.8: Cumulative Probability Density Function (CDF) for the distribution of
the duration of flows in milliseconds and number of flows per transport protocols.
A) The flows that generate alerts are shorter in duration than the average flow.
B) The legitimate flows with UDP are numerous due to DNS (port 53 UDP). The
number of alerts in UDP is more than 10 times greater than in TCP flows.
Figure 5.9 shows the characterization of the number of packets per flow in uplink
and bytes per packet in downlink direction. In uplink direction, Figure 5.9a, 80%
of alerts starts with 20 packets or less while normal traffic starts with almost 80
packets. This behavior is typical from probe or scans attacks that send small
amount of packet to discover target vulnerabilities. In Figure 5.9b alerts and
normal traffic show a similar pattern of 11% of flows, however, alerts use more
than 100 Bytes in more than 30% of flows.
Considering the amount of data transferred in each flow, Figure 5.10 compares the
round-trip flows in relation to volume in bytes. The disparity of the traffic volume
in both directions of the communication is evident. While in one way 95% of
traffic has a maximum volume of 100 B, in the other way, the same traffic share
presents up more than 500 B. This result demonstrates that the residential
broadband user profile is a content consumer. Another interesting point is that the
flows that generate alerts have a similar traffic volume profile in both directions.
Asymmetric traffic is more typical of the legitimate users.
Figure 5.11 shows the behavior of the sub-flows generated in each connection. A
sub-flow is considered a flow in one direction. Both Figures 5.11a,5.11b, sub-flows
size in uplink and downlink, shows a very similar behavior. More than 20% of
Normal traffic flows, reach 900 B, but this value is reached in almost 60% of the
flows. Values of sub-flows are almost ten times bigger than values represented in
49
0 20 40 60 80 100
Packets Number
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 (
C
D
F
)
Normal Traffic
Alerts
(a) Flows in the Uplink Direction
0 50 100 150 200
Bytes per Flow
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 (
C
D
F
)
Alerts
Normal Traffic
(b) Flows in the Downlink Direction.
Figure 5.9: Cumulative Probability Density (CDF) function for the distribution
of the number of packets per flow. Flows that generate alerts tend to have fewer
packets.
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Figure 5.10: Cumulative Probability Density (CDF) function for volume distribution
in bytes by flow. Flows that generated alerts tend to have smaller volumes in
transferred bytes.
Figures 5.10 where Bytes flows size are shown. This is because the flows are
mostly of short duration, evidenced in Figure 5.8a, and thus do not generate
sub-flows. Data analysis showed that the flows do not pass to the idle state.
Another important feature is the total amount of data in the packet headers.
Figure 5.12 shows that in both flows directions, alert and total traffic have the
same behavior. In particular, there is symmetry in the round-trip traffic in terms
of the volume of data in the headers. It highlights that malicious traffic do not rely
on the usage of header options. Also, in both senses, uplink and downlink show a
similar behavior. Until 90 Bytes per header alerts and normal traffic are similar,
however, with 900 Bytes are represented by almost 30% of normal traffic and close
to 60% of alerts flows.
At the end of the knowledge extraction phase, the profile of the alerts generated by
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Figure 5.11: Cumulative Probability Density (CDF) function for volume distribution
in bytes by sub-flow in each flow. Flows that generate alerts tend to have smaller
volumes in bytes that are transferred in sub-flows
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Figure 5.12: Cumulative Probability Density Function (CDF) for volume distribu-
tion in bytes of the data trafficked in headers. The behavior of traffic that generates
alerts is very similar to total traffic.
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Figure 5.13: Distribution of the main types of alerts in the analyzed traffic.
IDS were analyzed. Figure 5.13 shows which are the main classes of alerts
triggered by the IDS. Alerts for attacks against HTTP are the most frequent. This
class of alerts includes SQL injection attacks through HTTP calls and XSS attacks
(cross-site scripting). Home users can execute these attacks, as they use the
parameters of HTTP calls to insert some malicious code into the servers and,
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therefore, are not filtered by access rules. Other important alerts are port
scanning, vulnerability scanning, and execution of malicious applications (trojan
and malware). The scans are generally intended to identify open ports and
vulnerabilities in user premises such as the home gateway. Alerts for trojan and
malware identify activities typical of known malicious applications that aim to
create and exploit vulnerabilities in the devices of the home users. The other alerts
refer to mechanisms of information theft and to Byzantine-attack signatures on
common protocols, such as IMAP and Telnet9.
5.2 Feature Selection and Dimensionality
Reduction
An information can be represented or classified by its features or attributes. The
number of features or attributes used to represent information varies greatly. A
relevant problem is that increasing the number of attributes does not always
improve the accuracy of the information classification. This problem is known as
the “curse of dimensionality” [93] which states that there are an optimal number
of features that can be selected in relation to the size of the sample to maximize
the performance of the classifier.
Figure 5.14a shows that when dimensionality increases, the performance of the
classifier increases until the optimal number of features is reached. From this
optimal value, the performance falls. Therefore, from the optimal value of feature
number, increasing dimensionality without increasing the number of training
samples results in a decrease in classifier performance. Figure 5.14b shows the
performance degradation of the algorithms. The increase in dimensionality is
directly proportional to the complexity of the model, obtaining an error rate in the
low training. However, these models present the overfitting problem during the
training step, in which the data perform poorly in the test step. Figure 5.14c
shows that the number of dots increases exponentially with increasing
dimensionality. In spaces with many dimensions, the points become sparse and not
very similar, with points very distant from each other and approximately
equidistant, which leads to a classifier prone to errors. In addition, other problems
arise when using a high number of dimensions with machine learning algorithms.
Some traditional distance metrics, such as Euclidean distance, are no longer
meaningful in high dimensions, requiring the use of other types of metrics, such as
the cosine distance, which have a higher computational cost.
Therefore, it is common to reduce the number of features or dimensionality prior
9Mainly used for remote configuration of network equipment.
52
to the application of a machine learning algorithm.
(a) Performance of the classifier with increasing
dimensionality.
(b) Overfitting effect on training data, which re-
duces test performance.
(c) Exponential growth of the number of points
with an increase in dimensionality.
Figure 5.14: The “curse of dimensionality” problem. This problem asserts that there
are an optimum number of features that can be selected in relation to the size of
the sample to maximize the performance of the classifier.
Feature selection or dimensionality reduction techniques are used to further the
learning performance. Feature selection maintains the most relevant features of the
original dataset, creating an smaller subset of the features. On the other hand, the
dimensionality reduction takes advantage of the redundancy of the input data,
calculating a smaller set of new dimensions or synthetic features. The new
synthetic features are a linear or non-linear combination of the input features. The
main idea of the methods is to remove all redundant information, keeping only the
necessary information, which is sufficient to represent the original information.
The purpose of both feature selection and dimensionality reduction is to produce a
minimum set of features so that the new subset maintains the most similar
performance of the generating set. Therefore, feature selection and dimensionality
reduction improve classification performance by providing faster and therefore
economically viable classifiers. The feature selection has an additional property,
because it allows a better understanding of the process that generates the data. In
the dimensionality reduction the selected features are synthetic and composed of a
combination of the original features, which makes it difficult to understand the
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process.
The dimensionality reduction can also be seen as the process of deriving a set of
degrees of freedom, which are used to reproduce most of the variability of a
dataset [94]. Ideally, the reduced representation must have a dimensionality that
corresponds to the intrinsic dimensionality of the data. The intrinsic
dimensionality of the data is the minimum number of dimensions required to meet
the observed properties of the data. Generally, in dimensionality reduction a new
feature space is created through some kind of transformation of the original feature
space.
Thus, in the reduction of dimensionality, given the random variable of
n-dimensions x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), it is possible to find a lower dimensional
representation of it, s = s1, s2, . . . , sk) with k ≤ n. Many algorithms with
different approaches have been developed to reduce dimensionality that can be
classified into two groups: linear and non-linear. The linear reduction of
dimensionality is a linear projection, in which n-dimensional data are reduced in
k-dimensional data using k linear combinations of n variables. Two important
examples of linear dimension reduction algorithms are Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) and Independent Component Analysis (ICA).
The objective of the PCA is to find an orthogonal linear transformation that
maximizes the feature variance. The first PCA base vector, called the main
direction, describes better the variability of the data. The second vector is the
second-best description and must be orthogonal to the first and so on in order of
importance. On the other hand, the goal of ICA is to find a linear transformation
in which the base vectors are statistically independent and not Gaussian, that is,
the mutual information between two variables of the new vector space is equal to
zero. In signal processing, ICA is used to separate two mixed signals. A common
example is the cocktail party [95], in which the objective is to listen one-person
speech in a noisy room. Unlike PCA, the base vectors in ICA are neither
orthogonal nor ranked in order, all vectors are equally important. PCA is normally
used when we want to find a reduced representation of the data. On the other
hand, the ICA is normally used to obtain features extraction, identifying and
selecting the features that best suit the application.
Figure 5.15 shows the eigenvalues associated to the synthetic dataset
(GTA/UFRJ). The first fourth components calculated by the PCA linear
transformation represent 80% of the total variance. Therefore, these fourth
components are selected and the others, that represents less than 20% of the total
data variance, are discarded, improving the processing time, which is critical in
real-time applications.
In cases where high-dimensional data have a non-linear nature, linear algorithms
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Figure 5.15: Eigenvalue for each of the 24 flow features in GTA/UFRJ dataset. The
eigenvalue associated to each of the transformed features is proportional to the data
variance. 80% and 90% of the total data variance is represented between the fourth
and the sixth highest principal components.
do not perform well. This means that the relationship between classes is not
described in a linear subspace, as shown in Figure 5.16a. For these cases, it is
possible to use the PCA technique with kernels functions. A Kernel function
transforms the input vectors of the original space into a larger dimensional space,
in which the problem becomes linearly separable [33].
Figure 5.16 shows a comparison of linear and non-linear reduction methods. The
original dataset, shown in Figure 5.16a, is a case of two concentric circles, each
circle is a class. The goal is to reduce a 2-dimensions (R2) space into a 1-dimension
space (R1). After applying a linear reduction, Figure 5.16b, the Principal
Components cannot achieve a subspace where the classes are linearly separated
into space (R1). This is because the two concentric circles are two separable
nonlinear classes. After applying a non-linear method, such as a Gaussian Kernel
PCA, shown in Figure 5.16c, the method gets a subspace where the classes have
separated properly.
There are two approaches to class separation in data that cannot be separated
linearly, as shown in Figure 5.16a. The first mapping the data into a larger space,
in which the classes can be separated linearly by straight lines as shown in
Figure 5.17b. The example of Figure 5.17 is a binary example, in the plane of R1
there is no linear hyperplane that is able to separate the two classes.
If the problem is taken to a plane with a higher dimensionality, R1 → R2, it is
possible to find a hyperplane, dash line in Figure 5.17b that separates classes. The
dataset can be mapped into a space of a larger dimension, R1 → R2, and thereby
enable a linear hyperplane to separate classes, as shown in Figure 5.17b.
This hyperplane, when brought down to a smaller dimension, corresponds to a
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(a) Original dataset with
two features.
(b) Linear Principal
Component Analysis
(c) Kernel Principal
Component Analysis
Figure 5.16: Example of non-linear class separation. a) two classes in a concentric
circle manifold; b) The linear PCA is not able to separate properly the two classes;
c) A better result is achieved when used the Kernel PCA.
(a) Example of binary
classes.
(b) Mapping to a larger
dimension.
(c) Two classes separated by
a nonlinear figure.
Figure 5.17: Strategies for separating non-linear data distribution classes: a) original
dataset of two classes with non-linear distribution; b) data mapping with increase
of size that allows the separation with linear algorithms, such as PCA; c) use of
nonlinear hyperplane, as in the PCA nonlinear kernel algorithm.
nonlinear figure as shown in Figure 5.17c R2 → R1. However, when mapping to
larger dimensions, the “curse of dimensionality” explained above is incurred, which
generates a high computational cost. To solve this problem the “kernel trick” is
applied. A kernel function is a similarity function that corresponds to the dot
product in an expanded vector space. The idea is to find a nonlinear function in
which dimension mapping is not necessary and computation is independent of the
number of features. The idea is to find a nonlinear function in which dimension
mapping is unnecessary and computation is independent of the number of features.
If there exists a nonlinear transformation Φ(x) from the original D-dimensional
feature space to an M-dimensional feature space, where M ≫ D. Then each data
point xi is projected to a point Φ(xi). If the K() matrix containing the scalar
products among all pairs of data points is now calculated as
K(xi, xj) = Φ(xi)
TΦ(xj).Then each data point xi is projected to a point Φ(xi).
The most commonly used kernels are the polynomial, Gaussian and tangent
nucleus (hyperbolic tangent). If a used kernel is linear, we can see the standard
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PCA as a case of the Kernel PCA.
5.2.1 Feature Selection
The feature selection produces a subset of the original features, which are the best
representatives of the data. As opposed to dimensionality reduction there is no
loss of meaning. Feature selection techniques can be divided into three types of
algorithms [96]: wrappers, filter and embedded.
(a) Wrappers Methods.
(b) Filter Methods. (c) Embedded Methods.
Figure 5.18: Feature Selection Methods. a) Wrappers methods use a classifier to
evaluate the subset of features. b) Filter methods use heuristics to evaluate a feature
or a subset. c) The embedded methods use a specific classification algorithm to make
the selection naturally.
The wrappers algorithms, as shown in Figure 5.18a, use machine learning
techniques such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), decision tree, among others, to
measure the quality of features subsets without incorporating knowledge about the
specific structure of the classification function. Thus, the method will evaluate
subsets based on the accuracy of the classifier. The evaluation is repeated for each
subset until it finds a set that performs well. In high dimensional dataset this
search is a NP-hard problem. Wrappers methods tend to be more accurate than
the filter methods, at a higher computational cost [97]. One popular Wrapper
algorithm is the Sequential Forward Selection (SFS). Starting with an empty set S
and the full set of all features X, the SFS algorithm makes a bottom-up search
and gradually add features selected by an evaluation function to S, that minimizes
the mean square error (MSE). At each iteration, the feature to be included in S is
selected among the remaining available features of X. One problem of this method
is that SFS is prone to select redundant features. Once a feature is selected, it
cannot be chosen at a later stage.
Embedded methods are a sub-class of wrappers methods. In this case, the subset
of features is obtained as well as the model where they were selected. Embedded
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methods perform the feature selection process during the learning phase of a
classifier. These methods select features based on criteria generated during the
learning process of a specific classifier. In contrast to wrappers methods, embedded
methods do not separate learning from feature selection. As in wrappers methods,
embedded methods use the accuracy of a classifier to evaluate the relevance of the
feature. However, embedded methods need to modify the classification algorithm
in the learning process. The SVM-RFE feature selection method was proposed in
the elimination of recursive features in the selection of genes for cancer
classification [98]. The algorithm selects the features according to a classification
problem based on the training of a linear vector support machine (SVM). The
features with the lowest ranking are removed according to a w criterion,
sequentially backward. The criterion w is the value of the hyperplane decision in
the SVM.
To reduce the high computational cost of evaluating the various subsets of
classifier-based features, the filter methods were implemented. Filter methods are
called open-loop methods because they have no interaction with the classifier.
Instead of classifiers the method uses heuristics to evaluate the relevance of the
feature in the dataset [99]. As its name implies, the feature that does not exceed
the heuristic criterion is filtered. Gaining information, distance, consistency and
similarity between features as well as statistical measures are some of the most
used heuristics in filter evaluation. Since the selection process is done in a step
prior to classification, only after the best features are found, classification
algorithms can use them. While this method is fast to select features, having no
interaction with the classifier subset of feature may imply lower accuracy. One of
the most popular filter methods is Relief, in which the feature score is calculated
as the difference between the distance of the closest sample from the same class
and the closest sample of the different class. The main disadvantage of this
method is that data classes must be labeled in advance. Relief is limited to
problems with only two classes, but ReliefF [32] is an enhancement to the Relief
method that handles multiple classes using the nearest k-neighbors technique.
ReliefF is a supervised method in which classes labeling must be known prior to
application of the method. In applications such as network monitoring and threat
detection, network flows reach unclassified classifiers. Therefore, unsupervised
algorithms must be applied.
5.2.2 Correlation Based Feature Selection
We present the Correlation Based Feature Selection, a simple unsupervised filter
method for feature selection. Our algorithm is inspired in the Correlation Features
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Selection (CFS) [100]. Hall uses the idea of punctuating the variables through the
correlation between the variables and the output class. The CFS algorithm
calculates the correlation between the variable and the class to get the importance
of each feature. Thus, the CFS is dependent on output class information a priori,
so it is a supervised algorithm. The information dependence on the output class is
a limitation in applicability, such as the classification of network traffic, since there
is no a priori knowledge between the network traffic flow and the corresponding
class.
Our algorithm is based in the correlation between features. The Pearson
correlation of two variables is a measure of their linear dependence. Pearson
coefficient value is between −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, where 1 means that the two variables are
directly correlated, linear relationship, and −1 in the case of inverse linear
relationship, also called anticorrelation.
The Pearson Coefficient ρ, can be calculated in terms of mean µ and standard
deviation σ,
ρ(A,B) =
1
N − 1
N
∑
i=1
(
Ai − µA
σA
)(
Bi − µB
σB
)
, (5.1)
or in terms the of covariance
ρ(A,B) =
cov(A,B)
σAσB
, (5.2)
then we calculate the weight vector,
wi =
σ2
∑j=N
j=0 |Aij|
. (5.3)
Firstly, we need to obtain the correlation matrix, calculated with Equation 5.2,
line 1 algorithm 1. The correlation matrix is the pairwise covariance calculations
between all pairs of features. Then, using the Equation 5.3 we can establish a
weight w that is a measure of the importance of the feature. In order to calculate
w, we sum the absolute values of the correlation features, lines 5-6 algorithm 1.
This sum in absolute value is due to the fact that the Pearson coefficient, ρ, may
assume negative values. Then we calculate the variance V̂ of each feature that
privilege the feature that has greater variance and lower covariance, line 8
algorithm 1. The idea is to establish which feature represent the most information,
giving the correlation between two features. Furthermore, the weight values give
us an indication of the amount of information the feature has independently of the
others. The weight w has values between 0 ≤ N , where N is the number of
features, and 0 means that a feature is totally independent of the other. The
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higher the w value is, the higher is the correlation with other features, thus the
lesser is the aggregated information by this feature.
Algorithm 1: Correlation Based Feature Selection
Input : X: Matrix of Features
Output: r: Vector of Ranked Features, w: Vector of weights
1 A = Corr(X) /* Correlation Matrix */
2 for 0 ≤ i < len (A) do
3 Wi = 0
4 for 0 ≤ j < len (Ai) do
5 ki = abs(Aij) /* Absolute Values */
6 auxi+ = ki /* Sample Addition */
7 end
8 wi = V̂ (Ai)/auxi /* Calculate Weights */
9 end
10 r = sort(w, reverse = True)
5.2.3 Case of Use: Traffic Classification
In order to evaluate the proposed algorithm, we perform traffic classification to
detect threats. We chose this application, because it is very time sensitive and our
algorithm can significantly reduce the processing time, enabling prompt defense
mechanisms. We implemented traffic classification using machine learning
algorithms on our synthetic dataset GTA/UFRJ. Threat detection system must
allow real-time detection and the elimination of intervention from security experts
to classify threats and configure the system. Human intervention is a major source
of errors and an important factor that slows down threat detection. Then
automatic threat classification is fundamental for network security.
Decision Tree (DT) with C4.5 algorithm, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), and
Support Vector Machine (SVM), are the classification algorithms implemented to
evaluate the algorithm. We selected these algorithms because they are among the
most used for network security [101]. In all methods, we used holdout validation,
splitting dataset in 70% for training set and test with the remaining 30%. During
the training phase, we perform tenfold cross validation to avoid overfitting. In
cross validation, parts of the dataset are divided and not used in model parameters
estimation. They are further used to check whether the model is general enough to
adapt to new data, avoiding overfitting to training data.
In decision tree, leaves represent the final class and branches represent conditions
based on the value of one of the input features. During the training part, the C4.5
algorithm determines a tree-like classification structure. The real-time
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implementation of the decision tree consists in if-then-else rules that generate the
tree-like structure previously calculated. The results are presented in the
Section 5.2.4, along with the ones from the other algorithms.
The Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are based on the human brain, in which
each neuron performs a small part of the processing, transferring the result to the
next neuron. In artificial neural networks, the output represents a degree of
membership for each class, and the highest degree is selected. The weight vectors
Θ are calculated during the training. These vectors determine the weight of each
neuron connection. In the training, there are input and output sample spaces and
the errors, caused by each parameter. Errors are minimized through the
back-propagation algorithm.
In order to determine to which class a sample belongs each neural network layer
computes the following equations:
z(i+1) = Θ(i)a(i) (5.4) a(i+1) = g(z(i+1)) (5.5) g(z) =
1
1 + e−z
(5.6)
where a(i) is the vector that determines the output of layer i, Θ(i) is the weight
vector that leads layer i to layer i+ 1, and a(i+1) is the output of layer i+ 1. The
function g(z) is the Sigmoid function that plays an important role in the
classification. For high values of z, g(z) returns one and for low values g(z) returns
zero. Therefore, the output layer gives the degree of membership of each class,
between zero and one, classifying the sample as the highest one.
The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a binary classifier, based on the
concept of a decision plane that defines the decision thresholds. SVM algorithm
classifies through the construction of a hyper-plane in a multidimensional space
that split different classes. An iterative algorithm minimizes an error function,
finding the best hyper-plane separation. A kernel function defines this hyper-plane.
This way, SVM finds the hyper-plane of maximum margin, that is, the hyper-plane
with the biggest distance possible to both classes.
The real-time detection is performed by the classification to each one of the
classes: normal and non-normal; DoS and non-DoS; and probe and non-probe.
Once SVM calculates the output, the chosen class is the one with the highest
score. The classifier score of a sample x is the distance from x to the decision
boundaries, that goes from −∞ to +∞. The classifier score is given by:
f(x) =
n
∑
j=1
αjyjG(xj, x) + b, (5.7)
where (α1, . . . , αn.b) are the estimated parameters of SVM, and G(xj, x) is the
used kernel. In this work, the kernel is linear, that is, G(xj, x) = x
′
jx, which
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presents a good performance with the minimum quantity of input parameters.
5.2.4 Classification Results
We compare our feature selection algorithm with the methods presented in
Section 5.2. We try a lineal Principal Component Analysis (PCA), The ReliefF
algorithm, the Sequential Forward Selection (SFS), and the Support Vector
Machine Recursive Feature Elimination (SVM-RFE). For all methods, we analyze
their version with four and six features. In order to make a fair comparison, we
tested all the algorithms with the classification methods presented before. We use
a decision tree with the CART algorithm with minimum 4096 leaves, a binary
support vector machine (SVM) with linear kernel, and finally a neural network
with one hidden layer with 10 neurons. Figure 5.19 presents information gain (IG)
sum of the selected feature for each evaluated algorithm. Information gain
measures the amount of information, in bits, that a feature possesses in relation to
the class prediction, if the only information available is the presence of the given
feature and the corresponding class distribution. Thus, it is computed as the
difference of target class entropy and the conditional entropy of target class given
the feature value as known. When employing six features, the results show that
our algorithm has information retention capability between SFS and ReliefF, and
greater than SVM-RFE. The information retention capability of PCA, is greater
than feature selection methods, as each feature is a linear combination of the
original features and is computed to retain most of dataset variance.
Figure 5.20 shows the performance accuracy of the three classifiers algorithms
Decision Tree, Neural Network and Support Vector Machine (SVM). In the first
group, the decision tree best results is shown by our proposal with six features in
97.4%. The following result is PCA with four and six features in 96% and 97.2%.
The Sequential Forward Selection (SFS) presents the same result with four and six
features with 95.5%. The ReliefF algorithm has the same results in both four and
six features is 91.2%. Finally, the lowest result is show by SVM-RFE algorithm
with four and six features.
The second classifier, the neural network, the best result is shown by the PCA
with six features in 97.6% of accuracy, however the PCA with four features present
a very low performance with 85.5%. ReliefF presents the same results for both
features in 90.2%. Our proposal shows a result with 83.9% and 85.0% for four and
six features. On the other hand, the SFS presents the worst results of all
classifiers, 78.4% with four features and 79.2% with six features. One impressive
result is the SVM-RFE, with four features presents a very low result of 73.6% that
is one of the worst for all classifiers, however, with six features present almost the
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same best second result with 90.1%.
In the Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier, the PCA presents a similar
behavior compared with the neural networks. For six features presents the highest
accuracy of all classifiers with 98.3%, but just 87.8% for four features. ReliefF
again presents the same result for both cases in 91.4%. Our proposal has 84% for
four features and 85% for six features. SFS present the same result for both
features in 79.5%. The lowest accuracy of this classifier is the SVM-RFE with
73.6% for both cases.
The Sensitivity metric shows the rate of correctly classified samples. It is a good a
metric to evaluate the success of a classifier, when using a dataset in which a class
has much more samples than others. In our problem, we use sensitivity as metric
to evaluate our detection success. For this, we consider the detection problem as a
binary classification, i.e., we consider two classes: a normal and an abnormal
traffic. In this way, the Denial of Service (DoS) and Scan threat classes were joined
into a common attack class. Similar to Accuracy representation in Figure 5.20,
Figure 5.21 represents the sensitivity of the classifiers applying the different
methods of feature selection. In the first group, the classification with Decision
Three, PCA shows the best sensitivity with 99% of correct classification, our
algorithm achieves a performance with almost 95% of sensitivity, with four and six
features. Neural Networks, represented in the second group, has the best sensitivity
with PCA using six features with 97.7%, then our results show a good performance
with both four and six features in 89%. In this group the worst sensitivity of all
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Figure 5.19: Information gain sum for feature selection algorithms. The selected
features by our algorithm keeps an information retention capability between SFS
and ReliefF.
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Figure 5.20: Accuracy comparison of features selection methods. Our Proposal,
Linear PCA, ReliefF, SFS and SVM-RFE compared in decision tree, SVM, and
neural network algorithms.
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Figure 5.21: Sensitivity of detection in decision tree, SVM, and neural network
algorithms for feature selection methods.
classifiers is reached by the SVM-RFE with four and six features in 69.3%. Finally,
the last group shows the Sensitivity for Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier.
Again, showing a similar behavior as the previous group PCA with six features
shows the best sensitivity with 97.8%. Then, the second-best result is reached by
our algorithm, as well as with ReliefF, with 89% of sensitivity with both features.
It is worthy to note that our algorithm presents a stable behavior in Accuracy as
well as in Sensitivity. We highlight that our algorithm performs nearly equal to
PCA. PCA creates artificial features that are a composition of all real features,
while our algorithm just selects some features from the complete set of features. In
this way, our algorithm was the best feature-selection method that was evaluated,
and it also introduce less computing overload when compared with PCA.
Finally in Table 5.2 we present the features selected by each method of features
selection. We exclude the PCA because its output are new synthetic features. All
methods show six features according with its importance. It is possible to see none
of the methods selects the same features. Nevertheless, ReliefF and SFS selects as
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Table 5.2: Features Selection Comparison for the three Feature Selection Methods.
Proposal ReliefF SFS SVM-REF
Number
of Feature
12,15,19,
13,10,7
2,11,9,
19,22,3
15,11,8,
5,20,21
14,12,13,
24,23,22
Name
of Features
qtd tos,
packet len m,
qtd rst flag,
ttl m,
qtd pkt icmp,
qtd ack flag
qtd src port,
qtd pkt ip,
qtd pkt udp,
qtd rst flag
offset m,
qtd dst port
packet len m,
qtd pkt ip,
qtd urg flags,
qtd syn flag,
qtd ece flag,
qtd cwr flag
header len m
qtd tos
ttl m
qtd cdg icmp
qtd t icmp
offset m
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Figure 5.22: Performance of features selection algorithms according to processing
time. The proposal and the PCA show the best processing time.
the second-best feature number 11, “qtd pkt ip”. One surprised result from the
SFS is the election of the features 20 and 21, “qtd ece flag and qtd cwr flag”. In
the correlation matrix of our dataset presented in Section 5.1, we discussed in that
these two features do not add any information because they are empty variables.
We realized that one of the main features is number 15 “pkt len m”. In this
dataset, the average packet length is fundamental to classify attacks. One possible
reason is than during the creation of the dataset the Denial of Services (DoS) and
Probe attacks were performed for an automated tool. Mainly this automated tool
produces attacks without altering the length of the packet.
In Figure 5.22 we show a comparison in processing time of all implemented
algorithms for feature selection. All measures are in absolute value. Our proposal
and PCA are multiplied by 1000 in order to display the values. We consider
absolute value as the relation between the worst processed time and the processing
time of each algorithm. The value of 1 represent the worst result, achieved by SFS
show the worst performance. The SFS algorithm performs multiple iteration in
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order to minimize the mean square error (MSE). Consequently, all these iterations
increase the processing time. Our proposal shows the best processing time
together with PCA, because both implementations perform a matrix
multiplication, and matrix multiplication is a simple computation function. The
measurements are performed in Intel Xeon processors with clock frequency of 2.6
GHz and 256 GB of RAM.
The next experiment is to evaluate our proposal in different dataset. We use the
NSL-KDD dataset. The NSL-KDD is composed of 42 features with four classes,
DoS, Probe, U2R, R2L. To evaluate this dataset, we have increase the number of
classifiers. Besides SVM, Neural Network and Decision Tree, we add K-Nearest
Neighbors, Random Forest, Support Vector Machine (SVM) with Radial Basis
Function (RBF) kernel, Gaussian Naive Bayes, and Stochastic Gradient
Descendant. Adding these algorithms, we cover the full range of the most
important algorithms for supervisioned machine learning.
The Random Forests (RF) algorithm is a way to avoid class overfitting from a
simple decision tree. Random Forest constructs several decision trees that are
trained in different parts of the same dataset. This process decreases variance of
classification and improves the performance regarding the classification of a single
tree. The prediction of the class in the RF classifier consists of applying the
sample as input to all the trees, obtaining the classification of each one of them
and using a voting system to decide the resulting class. The construction of each
tree must obey the following rules: for each node d, select k features of total m
features, such that k ≪ m. To calculate the best binary division of the k features
for the node d, using an objective function; repeat the previous steps until each
tree reaches l number of nodes or until its maximum extension.
Bayesian algorithm (Naive Bayes - NB) starts from the strong premise of
independence between the features to simplify the prediction of the classification.
This mean that each feature does not influence the value of the others features.
From this premise, the method calculates the textit a priori probabilities of each
characteristic, or a set of them, for a given class. In the input of a new sample, the
algorithm calculates for each characteristic what is the probability of belonging to
one of the classes. The output of all probabilities of each feature will result in a
posterior probability of this sampling belonging to each of the classes. The
algorithm then returns the classification that contains the highest estimated
probability. According to the Bayes’ theorem, we have that the probability
posteriori is given by
P (C|X) = P (X|C) ∗ P (C)
P (X)
=
∏m
i=1 p(xi|C) ∗ P (C)
P (X)
, (5.8)
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where X is the unknown sample and C is the class to be parsed. Therefore, the
posteriori probability is given by the product of the conditional probability of X in
C with the a priori probability of the C class in the sampling, divided by a
constant term of standardization of the attributes P (X) for each sample. The
objective is to maximize the numerator to find the class that best fits the set of
features of the unknown sample. The NB algorithm can be implemented in several
ways. For a set of continuous feature values, it is assumed that the features follow
the normal distribution and therefore the Gaussian Naive Bayes(GNB) is used.
In this case, the individual probability of each feature, considering v the value of
the feature x of the input sample, is given by
P (x = v|C) = 1√
2πσ2C
e
(v − µC)2
2µ2C , (5.9)
where µC is the mean and σ
2
C is the variance of the values of x with respect to
class C. Other approaches include Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB), used for
discrete data, and Bernoulli Naive Bayes (BNB), in the case of binary variables.
The k-Nearest Neightbors - (k-NN) algorithm is a non-parametric classifier.
k-NN assumes no simple probability distributions on the data, and is easy to
implement. The class definition of an unknown sample is based on the k-neighbors
classes closest to the sample. The value k is a positive integer and usually small. If
k = 1, then the sample class is assigned to the class of its nearest neighbor. If
k > 1, the sample class is obtained by starting a resultant function, such as a
simple voting or weighted voting, of the k-neighbors classes. The neighborhood
definition is based on a measure of similarity between samples in the feature space.
Euclidean distance is commonly used in the threat detection literature, however,
other distances have good results and the best choice for similarity measure will
depend on the type of dataset used [102]. The Euclidean distance of two samples p
and q in the space of n features is given by
d(p,q) =
√
√
√
√
n
∑
i
(pi − qi)2. (5.10)
Although simple, the k-NN algorithm has a high computational complexity, since
for each new sample it is necessary to calculate its distance with all other samples.
Therefore, the k-NN algorithm is not suitable for large datasets.
In Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) algorithm a gradient is approximated
by a single sample. In a binary classification problem it is possible to use the
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Sigmoid Function, expressed by
hθ(x) =
1
1 + e−θ⊺x
, (5.11)
to perform logistic regression. In the Sigmoid function, low product values of the
parameters θ⊺ times the sample feature vector x return zero, whereas high values
return one. When a new sample x(i) arrives, the SGD evaluates the Sigmoid
function and returns one for hθ(x(i)) greater than 0.5 and zero otherwise. This
decision presents an associated cost, based on the real class of the sample y(i). The
cost function is defined in Equation 5.12. This function is convex and the goal of
SGD algorithm is to find its minimum, expressed by
J(i)(θ) = y(i)log(hθ(x(i))) + (1− y(i))log(1− hθ(x(i))). (5.12)
On each new sample, the algorithm takes a step toward the cost function minimum
based on the gradient of the cost function.
Validation in NSL-KDD dataset
In this experiment we vary the number of feature selected to evaluate the impact
in the accuracy. We analyze the performance with no feature selection (No FS),
and then we reduce features from 10% to 90%. All the experiments were
performed using a K-fold validation. The K-fold cross-validation performs K
training iterations in the fractions of the data and, at each iteration, in the K − 1
fractions of the remaining data, performs the test in a mutually exclusive way. We
use K = 10 that is the amount commonly used. Figure 5.23 shows the effect of
feature selection. No Feature Selection performs good for almost all algorithms,
however reducing the number of features in 10% improve accuracy in all
algorithms but in Random Forest. In contrast, a bigger reduction of feature
deteriorates the accuracy of the classifiers.
We also measure others metrics such as Precision, Sensitivity, F1 - Score, training
and classification time. We compare the effect of 10% reduction in all these
metrics. Figure 5.24 shows accuracy, precision, sensitivity and F1 - score for
dataset with no feature selection, Figure 5.24a, and with 10% of reduction,
Figure 5.24b. For KNN, SVM with Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel, and
Gaussian Naive Bayes metrics remain the same. For the Neural Network MLP and
for SVM with linear kernel an improvement between 2-3% in all metrics is reached
with a 10% of features reduction. Random Forest present the worst performance
when features are reduced, all metrics worsen their values between 8-9%.
Stochastic Gradient Descendant (SGD) also suffer a small reduction of 1% in their
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Figure 5.23: Evaluation of Feature Selection varying the selected features in NSL-
KDD dataset.
metrics. Decision tree are the most beneficed improving between 3-4% their
metrics.
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Figure 5.24: Accuracy, precision, sensitivity and F1-Score for NSL-KDD. a) Metrics
with no future selection. b) Metrics reducing only 10% of the initial features.
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Figure 5.25: Classification and training NSL-KDD. a) Times with no future selec-
tion. b) Times reducing only 10% of the initial features.
Figure 5.25 analyze training and classification time for all classifiers. Figure 5.25a
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shows training and classification time with no features selection, while
Figure 5.25b shows results with 10% of features reduced. KNN algorithm
augmented considerably its training time, passing from 0.63 seconds to 5.03
seconds, while classification time also suffer an increase passing from 1.89 to 2.88
seconds. Neural Network reduced training time in 9% from 22.99 to 20.92 seconds,
classification time got 0.01 seconds of increase. Random Forest was increased in
0.02 seconds in training time and classification time remain the same, these values
are negligible because of the error of the cross validation. SVM-RBF and SVM
with linear kernel are the most beneficed from features reduction. SVM-RBF
reduces 11% the training time while 16% the classification time. SVM-Linear
reduces 46% classification time from 654 seconds to 349 seconds and 40% training
time from 54.86 to 32.88 seconds. Feature reduction in Gaussian Naive Bayes,
Stochastic Gradient Descendant and Decision Tree impact strongly in training
time with a reduction of approximately 30%, while classification time was reduced
one-time unit in three algorithms.
5.2.5 Preprocessing Stream Data
Data preprocessing is the most time-consuming task in machine learning [103]. As
we explained in Section 5.2, feature selection is mandatory for machine learning.
However, all Feature Selection algorithms assume that data arrive pre-processed.
Normalization, also known as feature scaling, is an important method for proper
use of classification algorithms. If the features in the dataset has different scales, it
impacts on the performance of the classification algorithm. Ensuring normalized
feature values, normally between {−1, 1}; implicitly weights all features equally in
their representation. In classifier algorithms that calculate distance between two
points, a weighted feature effect is appreciated. If one of the feature has a bigger
range of values, the distance calculation will be highly influenced by this feature.
Therefore, the range of all features should be normalized so that each feature
contributes approximately proportionately to the final distance.
In addition, many pre-processing algorithms consider that data is statically
available before the beginning of the learning process [104]. However, in real-world
application, data is not presented before learning process. As a consequence, it is
necessary to use online pre-processing methods.
Current state of art has proposal several algorithms in online feature selection.
Perkins and Theiler Grafting algorithm based on a stage wise gradient descent
approach. Gradient Feature Testing (grafting) [105] treats feature selection as an
integral part of learning a predictor. The objective function is a binomial negative
log-likelihood loss. Grafting operates in an incremental iterative fashion, gradually
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building up a feature set while training a predictor model using gradient descent.
In each iteration, a fast gradient-based heuristic is used to identify a feature that is
most likely to improve the existing model. While Grafting algorithm is able to
handle streaming features, it needs to select in advance the value of a regularization
parameter lambda to determine which feature is most likely to be selected for the
model at each iteration. Choosing a suitable regularization parameter inevitably
requires information about the global feature set. Therefore, Grafting is ineffective
in dealing with streaming features with an unknown feature size.
The Alpha-investing method [106] considers that new features arrive in a stream
manner generated sequentially for a predictive model. The main advantage of
Alpha-investing is the possibility to handle candidate feature sets of unknown or
even infinite sizes. Every time a feature arrives, alpha-investing use a linear
regression to dynamically reduce the threshold of error to be included in the
model. As a drawback, alpha-investing only consider the addition of new features
without evaluating the redundancy after the feature is added.
Wu et al. presented the Online Streaming Feature Selection (OSFS) algorithm and
its faster version, the Fast-OSFS algorithm to avoid the redundancy of added
features [107]. The OSFS algorithm uses a Markov blanket of a feature to
determine the relevance of the feature in relation with their neighbors. The
Markov blanket for a node A in a Bayesian network is the set of nodes A composed
of A’s parents, its children, and its children’s other parents. In a Markov random
field, the Markov blanket of a node is its set of neighboring nodes. A Markov
blanket may also be denoted by MB(A). However, facing the scalability and
online processing challenges in big data analytics, the computational cost inherent
in those three algorithms may still be prohibitive when the dimensionality is
extremely high in the scale of millions or more.
Smart Preprocessing for Streaming Data (SPSD) is an approach that use min-max
normalization of numerical features [108]. The authors use two metrics to avoid
unnecessary renormalization, SPSD only renormalizes when change amount exceed
some threshold value of the metrics. Data streaming is grouped in equal size chunk
where all operations are produced. The first data chunk is used to take the
references min-max values and to send the normalized data for model training.
The metric 1 represents the amount of sample falling outside the min-max
reference values, the metric 2 is the relation between new samples values in each
dimension and the referenced min-max value for that dimension.
Incremental Discretization Algorithm (IDA) uses a quantile approach to discretize
data streaming [109]. The algorithm discretizes data stream in m equal frequency
bins. A sliding window version of the algorithm is proposed to follow the evolution
of the data stream. To follow the distribution drift, the algorithm maintains the
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data into bins with fixed quantiles of the distribution, rather than fixed absolute
values.
We propose an unsupervised preprocessing method. Our method include
normalization, and feature selection all together. The proposal is parametric-less.
Our algorithm follows an active approach for concept drift detection. The active
approach monitors the concept, the label, to determine when a drift occur before
take any action. Passive approach, in contrast, updates the model every time new
data arrives wasting more resources. We adapted the Feature Selection algorithm
presented in Section 5.2.2 to calculate correlation between features in a sliding
window. Also, a normalization algorithm is proposed to handle stream data.
Normalization Process
In our normalization algorithm 2, a histogram of a feature fi is represented as a
vector b1, b2, . . . , bn, such that bk represents the number of samples that falls within
the bin. For each feature of the dataset, we create an histogram. The main idea
behind the algorithm is to approximate the histograms to a normal distribution as
shown in Figure 5.26.
In practice, it is not possible to know in advance the min and max for an
attribute. As a consequence, we use a sliding window approach, where the dataset
X are the s last seen samples. For every sliding window we obtain the min and
max values of each feature. Then, data values are grouped in a set b of intervals
called bins. The idea is to divide the feature fi in a histogram composed by bins
b1, b2, . . . , bm, where m =
√
n+ 1, being n the number of features, as shown in
line 3 in algorithm 2.
A bin in the histogram represents a range of values, and the height of the bar
represents the frequency of values in that bin. Each bin is consist of thresholds k,
for example the feature fi is grouped in b1 = [mini, k1), b2 = [k1, k2), . . . ,
bm = [km − 1,maxi]. The step between threshold k is called pivot and it is
determined as (maxi −mini)/m, as it is show in algorithm 3. However, if the
min,max values of the previous sliding window are smaller/bigger than min,max
of the current window, that is, mini−1 < mini or maxi−1 > maxi, new bins are
created until the new values of min/max are reached. With the creation of new
bins, the proposal is able to detect changes in the concept drift but it cannot
follow the change in the distribution.
The frequency of each bin is obtained by comparing the sample xi against the
thresholds k of the bins, line 4 algorithm 4. If the value of the sample xi is
in-between the thresholds of the binj, then the frequency fqj of the binj is
increased by one. Moreover, we calculate the relative frequency of each bin as the
relation between the bin frequency and the total number of samples, frj = fqj/N .
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Algorithm 2: Stream Normalization Algorithm
Input : X: Sliding window of Features, w: Window Number
Output: H: Normalized Features, fr: relative frequency
1 if w == 1 then
2 for feature f in X do
3 bn=
√
n+ 1;/* n: number of features */
4 H=CreateHistogram(X,bn);
5 end
6 else if w > 1 then
7 for sample s in f do
8 [H, fr]=UpdateHistogram(X,b);
9 end
Algorithm 3: CreateHistogram() Function
Input : X: Sliding window of Features, bn: number of bins
Output: H: Histogram
1 [max,min]=CalculateMaxMin;
2 k=(max−min)/(bn); /* k: threshold */
3 for bin b in bn do
4 b=[mini, k);
5 k+=min;
6 end
Algorithm 4: UpdateHistogram() Function
Input : X: Sliding window of Features, bn: number of bins
Output: H: Histogram, fr: relavtive frequency
1 for sample s in X do
2 for b in bin do
3 if s in b then
4 b+ = 1;/* getting frequency */
5 else if then
6 add bin to b until s in b
7 end
8 fr=Calculate using Equation 5.13;
9 H=map fr to NormalDistribution;
10 end
Finally, the relative frequency values fr are mapped into a normal distribution by:
Z > P
(
x =
m
∑
0
frj
)
. (5.13)
with Equation 5.13 is it possible to see that all values are now mapped into a
normal probability distribution with µ = 0 and σ = 1, line 8 in algorithm 4. As a
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consequence, all samples are normalized between −1 ≤ xi ≤ 1.
Figure 5.26: Representation of the feature divided in histogram. Each feature is di-
vided in bins that represent the relative frequency of the samples comprised between
the thresholds k. The second step of the algorithm approximate the histogram to a
normal distribution.
If we consider the process that generate the stream is non-stationary it implies a
possible concept drift. Haim and Tov affirm that histogram must be dynamics
when dealing with streaming data [110]. That means that intervals do not have
fixed value and the bins adapts to concept drift. However, if the bins remain static
it reflects the evolution of the change during time [109]. In our application, feature
normalization for network monitoring, we follow the former approach. Maintaining
fixed intervals allow us to see how a feature evolutes over time. In addition, as our
histogram algorithm creates new bins when a value does not enter in any of the
current intervals, it gives us the possibility to detect outliers. If a bin contains a
value of 1 for several periods of time, we consider an outlier. In streaming data,
maintain all the samples xi is computationally inefficient and in case of unlimited
data it will never fit in the memory. Our algorithm efficiently keeps only the
frequency of each bins making.
Shapiro–Wilk test was used to verify that our proposal follows a normal
distribution after normalization. Table 5.3 show Shapiro-Wilk test, we considered
α-level = 5%. We evaluate the hypothesis that our proposal normalization method
follows a normal distribution. When check the results the proposal method has a
p-value of 0.24 > 0.05, and W is closer to one, W=0.93, then we assume that
samples are not significantly different than a normal population. In the case of
Smart Preprocessing for Streaming Data (SPSD),Max-Min normalization, p-value
is smaller than the α-level, and W indicates that it is far from 1. As a
consequence, we refuse the hypothesis assuming than sample data are significantly
different than a normal population. Figure 5.27 shows a graphical interpretation of
the Shapiro–Wilk test, it represent a sample after being normalized. We can see
that our proposal follows the normal distribution, the blue points follow the dash
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line, while the max-min approach follows a right skewed distribution.
Table 5.3: Hypothesis comparison for a normal distribution approach. In Shapiro-
Wilk test p-value is 0.24 > 0.05, and W is closer to one, W=0.93, confirming that
values follows a normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk
Mean W Mean p
proposal 0.93 0.24
max-min 0.65 9.28e-07
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Figure 5.27: Representation of the Shapiro-Wilk comparing the proposed normal-
ization algorithm with a max-min stream normalization.
The most complex function in the normalization process is to update the bins. If
the reference values max,min of the windows changed, the bins update functions
takes O(n) time. The creation of the histogram is only done in the first window
and takes constant time. The histogram update uses a binary search to fill the bin
value O(log n) times.
Many open-source software exist to abstract packets into flow features such as
tcptrace 10, flowtbag 11, Traffic Identification Engine (TIE) 12, flowcalc 13, Audit
Record Generation and Utilization System (ARGUS) 14, among others. We choose
flowtbag because it abstracts more packets features than others. Flowtbag get 40
features: (5) flow tuple information (IP/Ports/protocol), (4) packets/byte in
forward/backward direction, (8) packets statistics forward/backward direction, (8)
time between packets forward/backward direction, (4) flow time statistics, (4)
10Tcptrace http://www.tcptrace.org
11flowtbag: https://github.com/DanielArndt/flowtbag
12Traffic Identification Engine http://tie.comics.unina.it/doku.php
13flowcalc http://mutrics.iitis.pl/flowcalc
14ARGUS http://www.qosient.com/argus/
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subflow packets/bytes forward/backward direction, (4) TCP flags, (2) Bytes used
in headers, (1) type of service.
We group features into eight groups. Flow tuple information is removed because
our algorithm works with numerical features. Table 5.4 describes the groups. We
established the window size in 1000 samples. Figure 5.28 show accuracy for each
seven algorithms for classification. In Decision Tree all groups show a similar
behavior and have a very high accuracy rate. In Gaussian Naive Bayes and in
SVM with linear kernel, group 3 Time Between Packets and Group 5 SubFlow
information, represent the lowest accuracy. However, for the rest of the groups,
also reach very high accuracy. In K-Nearest Neighbors shows a special case,
besides group 2, which is the highest accuracy, all the other groups show a
different behavior. In Neural Networks Groups 2 and 3, Packet Statistics and Time
between Packets, are the highest accuracy the rest of the groups maintain in 50%.
Random Forest show a similar behavior than Decision Tree with high accuracy in
all their groups, nevertheless, the group 5 SubFlow information is the lowest.
Stochastic Descendant Gradient show the highest accuracy in group 2,6 and 7. We
conclude that group 2, Packet Statistics, is the most influent in the accuracy
calculation for all the classifiers.
Table 5.4: Features Groups
Group Description Number of Features
G1 Packet Volume 4
G2 Packet Statistics 8
G3 Time Between Packets 8
G4 Flow Time Statistics 9
G5 SubFlow Information 4
G6 TCP Flags 4
G7 Bytes in headers + ToS 3
To evaluate our model under concept-drift, we use the flow diagram of the
Figure 5.29. We force traditional learning methods to become adaptive learners in
order to detect the concept drift. Adaptive learners can dynamically adapt to new
training data when learned concept is contradict. Once a concept drift is detected,
a new model is created.
We validate the proposal with the Network operator dataset (NetOp). The dataset
is labeled in threats and normal traffic, a binary classification problem. We divide
the dataset in training set and test set, in a relation of 70% for training and 30%
for test. We consider the training set as static, in which T consecutive sample
windows have been presented for training. We have used the Synthetic Minority
class Oversampling TEchnique (SMOTE) [111] approach to oversampling the
minority class, only in the training set, initial window. When a number of samples
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Figure 5.28: Evaluation of group features with different machine learning algorithms.
in a class is predominant in the dataset is called class imbalance. Class imbalance
is typical in our application when attacks are rare events in relation to normal
traffic. The test set is streaming data arriving with the same frequency. Data is
grouped in a sliding window of N samples.
Figure 5.29: Flow diagram used for proposal evaluation
Figure 5.30 show the accuracy when we analyze one day from NetOp dataset, day
25, which was the day that presents the bigger number of threats. In this
experiment, we want to see the impact of the concept-drift in the final accuracy.
We train different statics algorithm with 30% of the dataset. We use as window
size 1000 samples. The decision tree has the worst accuracy when compared with
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Figure 5.30: Concept Drift detection. Evaluation of pre-processing methods for
concept drift detection. Our proposal was able to detect early concept drift in SGD,
Decision Tree and in SVM with linear kernel. Gaussian Naive Bayes shows a very
high performance with no concept-drift.
other algorithms. Decision tree shows a low accuracy in the first windows. This
behavior means that the model created in during the training step does not fully
represent the model of the entire dataset. Stochastic Gradient Descendant show a
similar behavior of decision tree having a concept drift in the second window. The
SVM with linear presents a concept drift in the seventh window. SVM-RBF shows
a lower accuracy during all experiment but a concept drift at the last window.
Finally, due to the implementation of the Gaussian Naive Bayes it follows the same
probability distribution as our normalization method, as consequence does not
present any concept drift.
This chapter present two security datasets. The first dataset was created at
laboratory GTA/UFRJ and presents three classes, DoS, Probe and Normal,
composed by 25 features. The second dataset was more than ten days of real
traffic for a network operator in Brazil. NetOp dataset is divided in two classes,
normal traffic and alerts and it is composed of 45 features. Also, we present an
unsupervised pre-processing algorithm. The evaluation of the algorithms shows a
good behavior in batch mode and in stream mode, being able to reach a good
performance in batch mode and capable of detecting concept drift in stream mode.
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Chapter 6
The Virtual Network Function
This chapter introduces the concept of Network Function Virtualization and the
Open Network Function Virtualization Platform (OPNFV). We present our
proposed threat detection system as a Virtual Network running on OPNFV that
will provide flexibility, agility, and cost reduction to monitor network traffic.
Moreover, we propose a heuristic for virtual sensor placement. Finally, we propose
a greedy based algorithm for service chaining.
6.1 The Network Function Virtualization
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) technology intends to offer software
virtualized network services using costumer on the shelf (COTS) hardware in order
to lower Operating Expenditures (OPEX) and Capital Expenditures (CAPEX)
costs, and greatly reducing the time to the market (TTM) of innovations [112].
The key idea is to offer communication, processing, and storing services for big
data [113]. Thus, Virtual Network Functions (VNF) are implemented in software
running on different physical servers, usually on a cluster environment. Therefore,
network services such as firewall and threat detection can be executed as a set of
VNF allowing a bigger flexibility, scalability, and easier deployment when
compared to traditional services. The main goal of the NFV technology is to
optimize network services. This concept is complemented with the idea of Software
Defined Networking (SDN) that provides a greater programmability for network
management due to its global network view in the network controller. Specially,
SDN acts in the control and in the implementation of packet forwarding and
processing, while NFV acts in the provision of network services, such as firewall,
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Network Address Translation (NAT), or even
higher layer services, such as Web servers, email servers, among others.
Instead of using expensive proprietary network equipment, a strong tendency is
rising to provide services with open-source trusted platforms that integrate the
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processing, storing, and communication of data. This means that the main concept
of NFV is to decouple the Network Functions (NFs) from the physical
infrastructure on which they run [114]. Trying to accelerate the implantation of
Virtualized Network Functions, the Linux Foundation develops a collaborative
project called Open source Platform for Network Functions Virtualization
(OPNFV)1. The main idea behind OPNFV is to use open-source software to
provide a platform compatible with the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) standards.
Figure 6.1: ETSI NFV MANO framework, composed by three main components,
Network Management System, NFV Architectural Layers, and NFV Management
and Orchestration.
Figure 6.1 presents the MANO framework. According with the ETSI definition the
MANO framework [115] consist of three functional blocks: The Virtualized
Infrastructure manager (VIM), which is responsible for manage and control the
physical and virtual infrastructure in a single domain. One NFV architecture
could contain more than one VIM specialized to manage one or more certain type
of NFVI resource such as compute, store, among others. Second is the Virtual
Network Function Manager (VNFM), that is responsible for the management of
the life cycle of one or more VNFs. Finally, the Network Function Virtualized
Orchestration (NFVO) combines one or more functions to create the end-to-end
service. The NFVO could be divided into resource orchestration and service
orchestration. Resource orchestration ensure there are adequate compute, storage,
and network resources available to provide a network service. This orchestrator
1The Open source Platform for Network Functions Virtualization https://www.opnfv.org/
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can work with the VIM or directly with the NFVI, and it has the ability to
coordinate, authorize, release, and engage NFVI resources independently of any
specific VIM. It also provides governance of VNF instances sharing resources of the
NFVI. On the other hand, the Service Orchestration is responsible for the creation
of end-to-end services composed by different VNFs, also known as service chaining,
and to manage the network topology for the different instances. Furthermore, the
MANO contains data repositories that keep different type of information. The first
is the Network Service (NS) catalog, which contains templates for services in terms
of VNFs can be deployed and implemented, as well as their connectivity in the
virtual links. This catalog can contain additional information such as NFV
instances lifetime. Another catalog is the NFVI resources, that contains the
information about available/allocated resources in the NFVI.
6.1.1 The Open source Platform for Network Function
Virtualization (OPNFV)
Figure 6.2: The OPNFV architecture: Network Virtual Function Infrastructure
(NFVI), Virtual Network Functions (VNFs), and Management and Orchestration.
The deployment and management of the OPNFV environments is coordinated by
Fuel.
Figure 6.2 shows the architecture of the Open source Platform for Network
Function Virtualization (OPNFV). As it can be seen, OPNFV implement only the
NFV Architectural Layer component from the ETSI NFV MANO framework. Fuel
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deploys and manages the OPNFV environment. Three main modules compose this
environment, the Network Function Virtual Infrastructure (NFVI), the Virtual
Network Functions (VNFs) and the Management and Orchestration (MANO).
MANO provides the functionality required for the provisioning of VNFs, and
related operations such as the configuration of VNFs and the infrastructure on
which these functions run.
When the ETSI MANO concept is mapping into the OPNFV platform, the NFVI
contains the compute, storage and network module. The compute module
administrates the virtual machines through the KVM hypervisor. The Storage
module uses the Ceph tool that is a distributed object store and file system. The
network module uses the Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm through
the OpenDayLight controller that manages the Open vSwitches virtual switches.
Network services are deployed in middleboxes or network appliances called
virtualized network functions (VNF). VNFs consist of one or more virtual machines
that run specific network functions such as firewall, IDS, NAT, among others. The
Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) can be combined together, chaining in deliver
full-scale networking communication services [116]. We implemented our proposed
Threat Detection System as a virtual network function (VNF). Finally, the
Management and Orchestration layer provides the logic and functionality required
for the provision of resources, configuring the VNFs and the infrastructure.
6.1.2 Threat-Detection Prototype Performance Evaluation
CATRACA [31] configuration is shown in Figure 6.3 as a virtual network function.
To evaluate the performance of the prototype, we analyze latency requirements
and speedup factor for real-time stream processing. We perform the experiments
in the OPNFV Brahmaputra 3.0 environment and we use a module developed by
the Sahara project to provide an Apache Spark cluster. Our OPNFV environment
is composed by 96 GB of RAM, 700 TB of storage and 128 cores of Intel Xeon
processors with clock frequency of 2.6 GHz. We calculate all the results with 95%
of confidence interval.
CATRACA first uses a machine learning model trained offline. A decision tree
algorithm is trained offline from dataset within a combination of normal traffic and
threats stored in a historical database. We distribute sensors machine to capture
traffic over the network. Sensor machine are simple devices that mirror captured
traffic to the spark cloud, specially to Kafka. Kafka abstracts message stream into
topics that act as buffers or queues, adjusting different production to consumption
rates. To avoid latency overhead, sensor machine must be as much simple as
possible. Finally, the offline model is loaded in the spark cloud, and the master
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Figure 6.3: Messages processed per second (left axis) and speedup factor (right axis)
in function of the task parallelism for the Apache Spark Streaming Engine.
VM will apply the model to classify network traffic in real time.
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Figure 6.4: Messages processed per second (left axis) and speedup factor (right axis)
in function of the task parallelism for the Apache Spark Streaming Engine.
The first experiment measures the performance of CATRACA in terms of
processing throughput and latency. The dataset is fully injected into the system
and also replicated as many times as necessary to obtain a huge amount of data to
submit into our system. The experiment calculates the consumption of messages
by our stream processing engine and its processing rate. We also vary the
parallelism parameter, which represents the total number of cores available for the
cluster to process samples in parallel. Each slave VM is configured with only one
core, and we create as many Virtual Machines as possible. Figure 6.4 shows the
results of the experiment. The left y axis shows the system throughput given by
the number of messages processed per second, and the right y axis indicates the
speedup factor. The speedup factor is calculated as follow: Slatency =
La1
La2
; Where
La1 is the latency of the system when parallelism is equal to one, and La2 is the
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latency of the system with the variation of the parallelism parameter. In other
words, it represents the decrease factor in latency or the speed up factor.
The proposed Virtual Network Function is able to improve the processing capacity
up to twenty cores in parallel. The system shows an improvement for latency as
well as for throughput. Considering throughput, the system is able to handle more
than five million of messages per second. Moreover, the speed factor reaches
around 4.65 for a parallelism of twenty cores. This value indicates that the system
can parallelize and improve the speed of almost five times with twenty virtual
machines running one core each.
The second experiment aims to show the operation efficiency of the implemented
function under live migration. The live migration offers a great flexibility for the
user and it is possible thanks to the virtualization, achieved through the OPNFV
platform. In our proposed threat-detection virtualized network function, live
migration provides several advantages. A security advantage is the possibility to
place and rearrange dynamically sensor machines to better protect the network
and reduce the threat detection time. We can place a sensor machines where
ingress more attack traffic or near a sensitive server to be protected. A general
advantage concerning the processing cluster is the ability to migrate machines,
allowing a smart distribution among the physical servers and enabling the
optimization of the number of running servers, avoiding the waste of resources.
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Figure 6.5: A Virtual Machine migration from the Physical Machine 1 to Physi-
cal Machine 2. The constant flow rate applied to the virtual machine at Physical
Machine 1, after 60 seconds approximately of migration, goes to Physical Machine
2.
Figure 6.5 shows the behavior of a network flow under live migration. In this
experiment we send a constant-rate flow of 200 packets per second from one virtual
machine to another. Both virtual machines are hosted in the same physical
machine. Then, approximately at 60 seconds, the migration process is started, in
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order to migrate the virtual machine that receive the flow to another physical
server. The Figure 6.5 show the low migration downtime, making the flow
unaffected under the migration. therefore, the migration feature allows our threat
detection application to set monitoring sensors as close to the client as possible,
avoiding latency problems.
6.2 Modeling and Optimization Strategy for
VNF Sensor Location
Our system has the capability to distribute sensors along the whole network.
Nevertheless, because of cost or performance reasons, we can establish a reduced
number of sensors instead of placing sensors in every switch. Hence, then sensor
placement results into an optimization problem. This section models formally the
problem of the sensor network placement. A heuristic is proposed to minimize the
sensors number and maximize the network coverage reached for each sensor. We
assume that each node owns enough processing power to analyze all incoming
network traffic, as it is for example, in a datacenter.
Let G be a finite connected graph G = (V ;E), where V is the non-empty set of all
available nodes in the network and E is the set of non-directed edges of G. Let
v ∈ V be a vertex, and s ∈ S ⊆ V , where S is the subset of nodes which are
implemented as a threat detection sensor. We use xv as the variable that
determines if vertex v holds a sensor s
xv =
{
1, if v ∈ S
0, otherwise
(6.1)
Each vertex sends a traffic unit to each other vertices. Therefore, the total amount
of traffic T in the network equals T = |V |(|V |−1)
2
. The traffic from the source i to
destination j uses a single path, and we represent whether vertex v is in the path
of i, j traffic by tvij = 1, otherwise t
v
ij = 0. Thus, the total amount of traffic passing
through vertex v is tv =
∑
i 6=j t
v
ij. We also define an auxiliary variable yi,j to
determine whether there is a sensor in the path from the source i to destination j.
The variable yi,j is given by
yi,j =
{
1, ∃ v ∈ V | xv ∧ tvi,j
0, otherwise
(6.2)
Thus, the total amount of traffic analyzed by the sensors is
Tx =
∑
i 6=j∈V
yij, (6.3)
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The objective function F (x) represents the global cost to minimize composed by
two objective functions: the number of sensors in the network and the total
network traffic coverage that is analyzed by all sensors. Then, we want to
minimize the global cost
minF (x) = Fsensor(x)− Ftraf (x), (6.4)
where Fsensor(x) is the relation between the sensor nodes and the total of vertices
in the network, expressed by
Fsensor(x) =
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
xv, (6.5)
and Ftraf (x) is the traffic percentage in relation to the total amount of network
traffic that each sensor node analyzes, given by
Ftraf (x) =
Tx
T
=
1
T
∑
i 6=j∈V
yij (6.6)
such that 0 ≤ Fsensor(x) ≤ 1 e 0 < Ftraf (x) ≤ 1. Besides,
∑
v∈V x
v ≤ |V |, and
xv ∈ [0, 1]. This problem can be reduced to a Set Covering Problem (SCP), a
nondeterministic polynomial time NP-hard problem. To solve this problem, we use
a greedy algorithm, which sorts the vertex list according to tv, the amount of
traffic that pass through the vertices. Thus, the algorithm chooses first central
nodes that concentrate the largest amount of the traffic. We use as metric the
amount of traffic H(x) = Tx/T covered by the current sensors. Hence, after the
selection of a sensor node, it is verified if the solution H(x) reaches a target
amount of traffic and stops. Otherwise, the algorithm selects another node. The
process is repeated until the sensor set covers the target amount of traffic, or when
it is not possible to add more sensors. Greedy algorithms make locally optimal
choices that eventually reaches a global optimal. Nevertheless, the computational
cost execution is low comparing with other solutions.
We also used the Simulated Annealing (SA) optimization method, which
guarantees convergence to a global minimal in an undetermined time. Every
iteration selects a number of sensors and their positions at random and generate a
new candidate solution that could be accepted in case it has a lower objective
function F (x) than the previous iteration. If the solution is worse than the
previous one, SA accepts the new solutions by a decreasing probability according
to iteration. Thus, the solution may be accepted even if the objective function is
higher to the previous one. This behavior is necessary to avoid the solution
convergence to a local minimal. The perturbation used to select the number of
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sensors and the positions follow a Cauchy distribution. Hence, we use the greed to
obtain the fastest result and the Simulated Annealing to evaluate how far from the
minimal the result is.
6.2.1 Optimal VNF Sensor Placement
To evaluate the proposed heuristic we use a real topology from topology zoo 2. The
analyzed topology is the Brazilian Internet backbone network, Rede Nacional de
Ensino e Pesquisa (RNP), that has 31 vertex with 34 edges distributed
geographically in the Brazilian states. The real topology can be seen in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6: The Brazilian Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa (RNP) real topology,
with 31 vertex and 34 edges.
We have evaluated our metric with two meta-heuristic solutions, greedy and
simulated annealing, and with a random choice. In addition, it is implemented the
choice by the betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is shown in
Equation 6.7, where σij is the total number of shortest paths from node i to node j
and σij(v) is the number of those paths that pass through v. The betweenness
centrality expresses the influence that a specific node could have on other nodes in
the network [117]. The betweenness centrality consider all the nodes and paths in
the network, while our proposal is relative to each node.
g(v) =
∑
i 6=v 6=j
σij(v)
σij
(6.7)
Figure 6.7a shows in percentage the covered traffic in relation with the number of
VNF sensors used. The system determines the best position that each node should
be located warranting the maximal network coverage. With low network coverage
2www.topology-zoo.org
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the behavior of all approaches are similar. The random choice shows the worst
behavior followed by the simulated annealing. Then, the simulated annealing
improved it results over the random choice. The betweenness and the greedy
proposal present an exact result until approximately 80%. Figure 6.7b shows in
higher detail the results. The random choice is still being the worst approach
followed by the betweenness. Both approaches with our heuristic show the best
efficiency for high values of network coverage, minimizing the number of sensors
nodes used. The simulated annealing presents better behavior despite of its high
computational cost. With 95% of network coverage the random solution use 15
nodes and the greedy and simulated annealing reduce it by two times using 7
nodes. Moreover, with 99%, the simulated annealing improves the result by more
than two times when compared with the random choice, placing 11 nodes instead
of 21 nodes required by the random choice.
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Figure 6.7: Efficiency results of different placement methods in function of the
number of sensor nodes required to cover all network traffic.
6.3 The Virtual Network Function Chaining
Problem
Service chaining simply consists of a set of network services interconnected
through the network infrastructure to support an application requested for the
costumer. Traditionally, Service Function Chaining (SFC) were built in the early
years of high-performance computing being rigid and static installed at fixed
locations in the core or at the edge of the carrier network [118]. The SFC is
enhanced with the advent of NFV that enables operators to configure network
services dynamically in software without having to make changes to the network at
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the hardware level. Therefore, virtualized NFs (VNFs) can be placed when and
where needed. This implies an optimization problem that uses VNFs or services as
a graph to address the requirement for a better utilization of resources, for latency
decreases and for network optimization [23]. Typically, network flows go through
several network functions as shown in Figure 6.8. When a NF or a set of NFs are
specified the flows traverse these NFs in a specific order so that the required
functions are applied to the flows. Usually, the NFs demand certain dependency
among them that should be chaining to the traffic in a network in a specific order.
Depending on the way each network function is set in the chain, it impacts in
network traffic, application performance, and latency.
Figure 6.8: Example of Network Function forwarding graph. Three Virtualized
Network Functions (VNF) are chained from the source to the destination to establish
a service. The virtual network functions are executed over the physical network
infrastructure.
The VNF chaining problem consists, thus, of two sub-problems. The first
sub-problem is the placement problem, in which the VNF instances are allocated
onto physical nodes. This problem consists into finding a physical node that has
enough resources to host the VNF, serving it with the requested resources. The
second sub-problem consists into a routing challenge, because mapping a set of
VNFs over a physical topology should consider the iteration among all VNFs. The
routing problem should ensure that the traffic between VNFs would always suffer a
limited delay, and the network path presents enough bandwidth. If any of these
constraints are not satisfied by the chaining scheme, the VNF request may not be
accepted. Therefore, deciding for accepting VNF requests is also part of the VNF
chaining problem.
6.3.1 The Proposed VNF Chaining Scheme
Our proposal considers a scenario in which the requests for a new Virtual Network
Function arrive to a network manager, who has to allocate them into the available
nodes. We consider as a request a sorted list of VNFs that describes the order in
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which traffic has to be processed. Therefore, the allocation of the request on the
network has to consider the order of the VNFs as well as the source and the
destination of the traffic handled by the set of VNFs in the request. We also
consider that, when allocating a VNF over a physical node, the physical node has
to provide enough resources to answer the needs of all hosted VNFs. Our proposed
scheme is composed of two main phases. The first phase is to estimate the
resources available on the physical nodes and the resources requested by the VNFs.
The second phase is to run a greedy algorithm that takes as input the VNF
requests as they arrive, and then it places each VNF on a physical node that have
enough resources. Our greedy algorithm considers four different heuristics to place
the VNFs on the network.
Estimating the available resources on physical and virtual nodes is challenging
because there are three main resources which should be considered: CPU, memory,
and network. In order to summarize all resources into one single variable, we
consider the Volume metric introduced by Wood et al. [59]. We consider that the
volume of a physical server is 1, and the volume of each VNF is given by
V olumeV NF =
1
1− cpu ∗
1
1−mem ∗
1
1− net, (6.8)
where cpu stands for the normalized CPU usage of the VNF, mem for memory,
and net for network. Thus, for each VNF the volume metric is the ratio of the
resources on physical node that the VNF is requesting. The VNF volume ranges
from 0 to 1, where 1 means that a VNF is requesting an entirely available physical
node to be installed.
Following, on the second phase, we run a greedy algorithm that allocates a VNF
request as it arrives. Our algorithm adopts one of the four heuristics:
• minimum latency, in which the algorithm chooses the node that
introduces a minimum delay to the path, in comparison to the previous
selected nodes to host the other VNFs, or the source of the traffic;
• maximum usage of resources, in which the algorithm chooses the node
that has the biggest amount of available resources to host a VNF, without
considering the routing constrains between the already placed VNFs;
• most central nodes, in which the algorithm chooses to place the VNF into
the most central node, i.e. the node that presents the greatest
betweenness-centrality value, and has enough resources to host the VNF;
• weighted latency and resource, in which the probability of choosing each
a node for hosting a VNF is weighted based on the latency that it introduces
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to the path and the available resources that it has. The weight of the node i
is given by
wi =
(
1− lati
maxj∈N (latj)
)
×
(
reci
maxj∈N (recj)
)
,
where lati stand for the latency introduced by node i, reci is the available
resources in node i, and N is the set of all nodes in the network. The greedy
algorithm searches for hosting VNFs on the nodes that have the biggest wi
value first.
Our proposal works as follows. First, the network manager receives a sorted list
with the requested VNFs, the source and the destination of the traffic, and the
requested resources of each VNF. Then, our algorithm selects the first VNF on the
request and search for a node in which the requested resources meet the available
resources on the physical node. To verify if the physical node has enough
resources, the algorithm compares the VNF volume with the available volume of
the physical node. If the available volume is greater than the requested, the VNF
is installed on this candidate physical node. Otherwise, the algorithm selects the
next physical node till finding an available node. If there is no available physical
node that meets the requested VNF volume, the VNF request is entirely rejected
and no VNF is allocated. After mapping all VNFs over the physical nodes, the
VNFs are installed and the volume of each physical node that receives a VNF is
decremented by the volume of the VNF that it hosts. It is worth noting that a
VNF request should be entirely accepted or rejected. If the algorithm realizes that
there is not enough resource in any node in the network to complete the VNF
request allocation, the request is completely rejected and no node is allocated on
the network. We adopt the all or nothing approach, because a partially allocated
VNF request does not implement all packet-processing functions that it supposed
to deploy, thus it is not a feasible solution.
6.4 The Evaluation of the Proposal
We evaluate the proposed greedy algorithm through simulation. We implemented
a simulator3, written in Python language, in which the VNF requests arrive at
each simulation step. At a simulation step, the proposed scheme evaluates the
used resources of each physical node on the network topology and generates the
available volume metric for each physical node. Then, our scheme gets the next
3available at https://github.com/tinchoa/VNFsimulator
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Figure 6.9: Probability density function of the number of VNFs in a request. The
modeled number of VNFs in each request follows a normal distribution, with mean
equals to 4, and standard deviation equals to 1 (µ = 4 and σ = 1).
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Figure 6.10: Probability density function of the volume of resources used by each
VNF. The modeled resource consumption of each VNF follows a lognormal distri-
bution, with mean equals to 3, and standard deviation equals to 1.17 (µ = 3 and
σ = 1.17). The lognormal distribution is truncated at 100, which represents the
maximum volume usage (volume = 1).
request and allocates the VNFs on the network according to one of the proposed
heuristics.
We establish the proposal evaluation in two steps. The first step is to simulate the
costumer Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) requests. The requests are generated
based on a normal distribution with µ = 4 and σ = 1, as it is shown in Figure 6.9.
In this way, the customer requests are generated randomly associating different
number of VNF for each request. We model the number of VNFs in each request
92
based on the studies realized by Sekar et al. [20]. We consider that a Virtual
Machine (VM) deploys each VNF. Then, we simulate the resource consumption of
each VNF. We model the resource consumption based in a lognormal distribution,
with µ = 3 and σ = 1.17, as it is shown in Figure 6.10. The resource consumption
of each VNF is modeled as a truncated lognormal distribution because it should
reflect the behavior of the middleboxes, in which it usually uses a small amount of
resources. The distribution is truncated at 100, because it is the maximum volume
that a VNF can assume (volumeV NF = 1). As result, we obtain the costumer VNF
request with different resource volume and a selected order of chaining. We
highlight that the resources of the all VNFs over a single physical host is never
higher than 100%. An example of a VNF costumer request is
[V NF1 = 15%, V NF2 = 26%, V NF3 = 45%]; src, dst, where the number of VNF
are randomly chosen, and the src and dst are the source and destination of each
chaining request. The source and the destination are uniformly chosen on the
network topology. Our model does not consider that VNFs quit the network after
being allocated.
The second step of the proposal evaluation asserts the optimization heuristics. Our
experiments evaluate the placement heuristics against the RNP (Rede Nacional de
Pesquisa) topology. Using a greedy algorithm, we place the VNF in different nodes
and we evaluate the amount of VNF requested for each heuristic. We consider only
the propagation delay between the nodes to estimate the latency between the
nodes. The propagation delay is estimated according to the distance between
nodes. We consider the propagation speed of 2× 108 m/s, which is commonly used
in other works [119]. The distance between each node is calculated based on the
geographic location of each node.
The results in Figure 6.11 show that the maximum resource allocation heuristic is
the one that accepts more requests around 53% more request than the
betweenness-centrality heuristic. The betweenness-centrality heuristic is the
simplest to calculate, as it only depends on the topology characteristics.
Nevertheless, it is the one that rejects the greatest number of requests. In
addition, the latency heuristic presents a better performance when compared with
the betweenness-centrality, however, this heuristic shows the worst complexity
when executed. It is worth noting that, although the maximum resource allocation
heuristic optimizes the acceptation rate of VNFs on the network, it does not
consider the routing constraints between VNFs. In this way, it increases the delay
introduced by the deployment of network functions as VNFs because the packets
may pass through distant nodes in order to follow the entire packet-processing
path.
We also compare the dispersion of the latency distribution of the allocated VNFs
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Figure 6.11: Number of accepted requests for each proposed heuristics. The max-
imum resource allocation heuristic is the one that accepts more requests. The
betweenness-centrality heuristic is the simplest to calculate, as it only depends on
the topology characteristics, but it is the one that rejects the greatest number of
requests.
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(b) Dispersion of the remaining idle resource
distribution after allocating all VNFs.
Figure 6.12: Btw stands for the betweeness-centrality; Lat, for latency; Wgtd, for
weighted latency and resource; Resc, for maximum resource. a) The minimum la-
tency heuristics introduces the lower average delay on the packet-processing path.
The maximum resource usage heuristic is the one that presents the greatest disper-
sion into the latency distribution thanks of ignoring the latency concerns when plac-
ing the VNFs. b) The Maximum Resource heuristic presents the most distributed
remaining resources.
for each heuristic. As shown in Figure 6.12a, the minimum latency heuristics
introduces the lowest average delay on the packet-processing path. The maximum
resource usage heuristic is the one that presents the greatest dispersion into the
latency distribution thanks of ignoring the latency concerns when placing the
VNFs. This result shows that the Latency heuristic reduces 52% the average delay
when compared with the betweeness-centrality heuristic. Moreover, the latency
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heuristic also achieves the greatest number of accepted VNF requests, which have
the minimum latency, even when compared with maximum resource allocation
that achieves to allocate more requests than all others. Figure 6.12a also reveals
that the latency is limited in all heuristics and, even in the highest delay scenario,
it is still limited to 150 ms. Figure 6.12b shows the remaining resources after all
VNF allocation. Although the maximum resource heuristic instantiates more
VNFs, it presents the biggest amount of idle resources. Nevertheless, it is also the
most distributed idle resource pattern, which implies a load distribution between
all physical nodes.
Comparing Figures 6.11 and 6.12a, we emphasize that the greater dispersion of the
latency achieved by the maximum resource allocation heuristic is a reflect of the
greater number of accepted requests, when compared with the minimum latency
heuristic. It is worth noting that all heuristics are compliant with the resource
constraints. Therefore, choosing among the four heuristics, when designing a NFV
environment, should consider the goals of the network manager. In case of the
main goal is to maximize the number of accepted VNFs, the results show that we
should select the maximum resource allocation heuristic, in order to presents good
results of latency between nodes. Nevertheless, if the main goal is to achieve the
maximum performance of VNFs, the minimum latency heuristics is best choice.
Intermediary solutions are the weighted latency and resource solution, which keep
the bounded latency, and it increases up to 22% the acceptance rate when
compared to the Latency heuristic.
In this chapter we analyze our Virtual Network Function performance. First we
describe the Network Function Virtualization and the Open Network Function
Virtualization Platform (OPNFV) and the benefits it brings to CATRACA. Then
we propose a heuristic for virtual sensor placement maximizing the traffic analyzed
with the minimum number of sensors in the network. Finally, we propose a greedy
based algorithm for service chaining. We evaluated four heuristics. Our simulation
and results show that using a heuristic for placing VNFs on nodes with the biggest
amount of available resources increases the acceptation rate of VNF requests by
53%T
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This work proposed a fast and efficient network monitoring and threat detection
system. We used a combination of machine learning and stream processing for real
time threat detection. A new generation of tool is needed in order to real-time
monitor and secure computer network. We described and compared the
three-major open source distributed stream processing systems: Apache Storm,
Apache Flink, and Apache Spark Streaming. We performed throughput analysis,
allocating more processing cores to achieve higher processing rates, Apache Storm
was able to process up to 15 Million samples per minute. Also, we performed fault
tolerance test to compare these three most popular open-source Distribute Stream
Processors (DSP). In this case, we showed that Spark streaming, using
micro-batch processing model, can recover the failure without losing any messages.
Spark Streaming stores the full processing state of the micro-batches and
distributes the interrupted processing homogeneously among other worker nodes.
In order to increase the analysis speed and improve the efficiency of big data
analysis, it is mandatory to implement pre-processing methods. This work
presented and compared different methods for dimensionality reduction and
Feature selection. Furthermore, we proposed a new fast-unsupervised algorithm for
pre-process stream data. The algorithm includes feature selection and data
normalization. Our feature selection algorithm calculates the correlation of the
features in a network traffic data and selects the best features in an unsupervised
way. We selected the features with the higher absolute correlation in comparison
with the others methods. This procedure tends to gather the features with most of
the information of the dataset in a new set of reduced features. The reduced new
set of features is used, thus, to train the machine learning methods that classify
and characterize the network traffic. Our algorithm was up to 10 times faster than
literature algorithms for feature selection. We evaluated the feature selection
algorithm in two different datasets achieving good performance. Moreover, our
pre-processing algorithm is able to detect concept-drift in stream data. We showed
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that our normalizer adapts the data to a normal distribution reducing the error of
machine learning classifiers. To evaluate the proposed algorithms, we implement
eight machine learning algorithms, decision tree, neural networks, k-nearest
neighbors, support vector machine with linear and Radial Basis Function (RBF)
kernel, Gaussian Naive Bayes and Stochastic Gradient Descendant. We evaluated
machine learning algorithm performance under six metrics, accuracy, precision,
sensitivity, F-1 score, classification and training time.
We created two datasets publicly available. First a synthetic security dataset
obtaining real network traffic along with network threats composed of 24 features.
The GTA/UFRJ dataset contains more than 16 different types of attacks, as well
as normal network traffic. The second dataset, NetOp, is composed by more than
ten days of real traffic from a real telecommunication operator network located in
the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The dataset represents the use of the fixed-line
access service of 373 home users. The analysis of the data allows identifying that
the main services accessed are those of DNS and web services. We use this
information to create more than 5 TB of data combined in 45 flows features. Each
flow is classified as normal traffic or alert from a previous Intrusion Detection
System.
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is a promising technique that enables to
decouple the network function from its physical realization by virtualizing the
network equipment. Thus, network functions are deployed within virtual
environment and, thus, called Virtual Network Functions (VNF). Therefore, we
deploy our threat detection system as a virtualized network function. The threat
detection function is implemented in the Open-source Platform for Network
Function Virtualization (OPNFV) and shows high high throughput and a low
latency and live migration features.
Combining stream processing, machine learning and feature selection we created
the CATRACA tool. The proposed tool is executed in an OPNFV environment
allowing the system to perform migration as closets as possible to the source
attack. Moreover, the tool combines batch and stream processing in a big data
architecture that allows to performs threat analysis on incoming traffic in real time
on a historical database. Our tool displays the knowledge extracted from the
enriched data through a graphical user interface for visualizing different analyzes
and the geographical location of the source and destination of the threats in real
time. CATRACA code is publicly available.
Finally, we proposed a method for the strategic location of traffic capture sensors.
For this, a mathematical modeling was developed, obtaining a heuristic that
considers the minimum number of sensors reached the maximum coverage of the
network. The evaluation of the heuristic was analyzed in two different real
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topologies. The results show that with a high network coverage the proposed
system has a great gain in relation to random choice. In addition, we modeled and
discussed the VNF sensor placement as an NP -hard problem. Our heuristic
reduces the number of sensor and maximizes the network coverage.
We proposed a VNF chaining scheme, in which a greedy algorithm places the VNFs
on the network according to four different criteria. Our simulation and results
showed that using a heuristic for placing VNFs on nodes with the biggest amount
of available resources increases the acceptation rate of VNF requests by 53%.
Moreover, we also showed that using a heuristic for introducing minimum delay on
the path, we are able to reduce the average packet-processing delay by 52%.
7.1 Future Work
New methods of anomaly detection and traffic classification need to be
experimented in CATRACA to avoid the use of the batch layer. Algorithms such
as deep learning or Hoeffding Trees should be implemented in the tool. Due to the
distributed nature of our monitoring and threat detection tool, we need to
implement an algorithm for event correlation. A future work foresees to detect
intrusion symptoms by collecting diverse information at several architectural
levels, from raw packet until system logs, using distributed security probes, as well
as performing complex event analysis based on a complex event processing engine
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